

AQUINAS ON ANGELIC WILL AND MORALITY

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Abstract

The possibility of created incorporeal substances endowed with enormous knowledge and strengthened will with the natural seed of grace, not laden with sensible passions, and not tempted by other devils since it was non-existent at the time falling into sin is baffling to the imagination. At first value, they should be able to choose good over evil owing to the fact they are equipped with all they require to pursue the object of their will. If a major number of the angels accomplished the ultimate object of their will, what explains the success of most of the angels over the unsuccessful angels? The angelic will's nature should be an area of interest for exploration to underline its characteristics and whether there are differences between the angelic will and that of humans. God is love and His mercy endures for an eternity, is His mercy available to all His creatures including the apostate spiritual substances? These are some of the considerations that Aquinas answers in this article.

Keywords: God, Angels, Angelic Will, Love, Good, Beatific Vision, Aquinas

Introduction

The tenet of this article is to discuss Thomas Aquinas' theology of the will of the angels ranging from the nature of the angelic will to the object of their will, the perfection of the angelic will, the moral and immoral use of their will and lastly the punishments attached to the abuse of their will as well as the reward for the appropriate use of their wills. The essay focuses solely on Aquinas' *Summa Theological* as a reference for this discussion.

Much of this work will revolve around the theological and philosophical debate on the nature of the angelic will. As a philosopher and a theologian, the author sought to address important philosophical issues regarding the will of the angels using political theory, metaphysics, natural law, and ethics. It is important to note that Aquinas influences

church tradition, especially the traditional attitude toward angelic nature in general, because of his tremendous influence in his defence of divine revelation and sensory perception.

Patience is needed when interpreting Aquinas because the Summa is a complex collection of challenges and responses, and each statement must be painstakingly untangled in conformance with his comprehension or application. Understanding how Aquinas defends his conception of angelic will and his philosophical attitude, in general, are important. To sustain the consistency of nature, which enables the essence (reality or substance) of the angels, one must comprehend how knowledge is acquired and how the will is moved by its appetitive drive toward its object.

The Nature of Angelic Will

To discuss the nature of the will of the angels, it is first fitting that we understand what the will is for Aquinas. Aquinas described it as that which has these: first, some creatures are inclined towards good, with zero knowledge of the good, but simply moved by their natural inclination, this is called natural appetite and an example of such beings are the plants and other inanimate objects. Second, there are creatures drawn to an aspect of good, with only specific and limited knowledge of the good which is solely concerned with sensation, sensations which are sweetness or bitterness, and coldness or hotness etc., the inclination which apprehends this kind of good is called sensitive appetite. Third, other things tend towards the good, but they also have knowledge that allows them to recognize goodness; this is the domain of intellect. This is a perfect disposition towards what is good; not as if it were just steered by another towards a certain particular good only, like things bereft of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, like things with only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined toward good generally based on knowledge of the good gained from the intellect (Eisen-Murphy 2000, Eardley 2003, Bonnie 2007). Aquinas refers to this tendency as "will". As a result, angels have a will since they possess the cognition to understand the general nature of things (ST, I, q.59, a.1, co., Hoffmann 2007).

Having described the will as one of the criteria for knowing the nature of the angelic will, we intend next to distinguish the will of the angels from the angelic nature, to further comprehend the nature of the will of the angels. To distinguish the difference between the will and nature of the angels, Aquinas related this example: the natural body's essence is distinct from the senses of the body in the manner that the nature of the body is defined by matter and the form of the body while the senses of the body are superadded to the nature of the body. In like manner, the angelic will move towards the ultimate good (Kenny

1993) while their nature is also good but if their will and nature (Stepien 2015) were the same, their will, will not strive towards that which is supreme to the good of their nature, this kind of will that seeks not further good beyond its goodness which is the ultimate good only belongs to God and no other creatures, not even the angels (ST, I, q.59, a.2, co.).

It is also of vital importance to tell the separating attribute between the nature of angelic intellect and angelic will, to further create clarity. Neither will nor the intelligence of an angel can be the same thing. The angelic intellect extends to what is outside of it because what is outside of it is predisposed to be somehow within it because knowledge only exists insofar as the object known is within the knower angel. The angelic will, on the other hand, reaches out to what is outside of it because of a kind of tendency that it exhibits. Currently, it is the responsibility of one faculty (the angelic will) to look for what is outside of it, and the responsibility of another faculty (the angelic intellect) to have something inside of it. As a result, every species must necessarily possess distinct capacities of cognition and will (Ibid.). Further, these two angelic faculties are differentiated by the nature of their objects. The object of the angelic intellect is truth while the object of the angelic will is good (ST, I, q.59, a.2, ad.2). Also worth noting is that since the good and the truth are interchangeable, the intellect understands the good as something true, while the will desires the true as something good. The faculties can nevertheless be diverse enough due to the variety of their elements (ST, I, q.59, a.2, ad.3).

The angels are free-will beings thanks to their will. A will is not a will if it is not free, but what causes a will to be free? Aquinas in continuation of his discussion on the characteristics of the angelic will gave a breakdown analysis by looking at the cause of movement in things. There are certain things that, like how the archer directs the arrow to the target, are pushed and made to behave by others rather than acting as a result of any prior judgment. Others, like irrational animals, act based on some sort of judgment rather than having free will. For example, a sheep flees from a wolf because it believes doing so will save it from danger; this form of judgment is not one that the sheep has, but rather one that is ingrained in it by nature. On other hand, angels perceive the common note of goodness, which they use to determine whether one thing or another is good, only an agent equipped with intellect is capable of acting with free judgment. As a result, free will exists everywhere there is intellect. Therefore, it is clear that the angels have free will (ST, I, q.59, a.3. co.).

It is also like the angelic will to not act on the back of cognitive discursiveness. Discursive reasoning is characteristic of the human intellect whereby it engages in a series of inquiries to arrive at the truth before the will tends towards the truth because it is good.

But the angels need no discursive reasoning to arrive at the truth, by extension, the angelic will does not rely on the discursiveness of the angelic intellect to act (ST, I, q.59, a.3, ad.1). Free will is not in equal measure in nobility in all the angels. Free choice and intellectual judgment both exist in higher angels and lower angels, but more nobly in the superior angels (Ekenberg 2005). However, it is true that freedom, insofar as the abolition of compulsion is concerned, is not amenable to greater and lesser degrees; for privations and negations are neither enlarged nor decreased directly of themselves, but only by their cause, or via the inclusion of some qualification (ST, I, q.59, a.3, ad.3).

The indivisibility of the angelic will is another feature of their will. Their will is unaffected by irascible and concupiscible appetites. The sensitive appetite is divided into irascible and concupiscible appetites. If an object is responded to according to a common object, there will be no differentiation between faculties according to the diversity of the specific things contained within that common idea. Instead, faculties are differentiated from one another only by the formal distinction of objects (McInerny 2016). Having such distinction in mind, there can be no appetite other than for what is good, therefore the object of the intellectual appetite, also known as the will, is excellent following the common feature of goodness. Thus, unlike the sensitive appetite, which does not yearn for what is good in its general aspect but for some specific good object, the hunger in the intellectual part is not separated according to the distinction of certain specific beauties. Since only an intellectual appetite exists in angels, this means that their appetite is not separated into irascible and concupiscible, but rather stays undivided and is referred to as the will (ST, I, q.59, a.4, co.).

Following from the immediate paragraph that irascible and concupiscible passions cannot be attributed to the angels, the wicked angels are to be said full of anger only in a metaphorical sense (ST, I, q.59, a.4, ad.1). Insofar as these are passions love and joy resides in the concupiscible appetite; however, insofar as they represent a straightforward act of will, they reside in the intellectual part. In this sense, to love is to wish someone well, and to be glad is for the will to rest in some good that has been attained. None of these things is typically spoken about as angels being driven by passions (De Civ. Dei IX).

The Object of the Angelic Will

The object of the angelic will is love or good, and this love is natural to the angels. To demonstrate how love is the natural object of the will, Aquinas argued that what comes initially (essence) is always maintained by what follows (powers). Since every subject's nature is its essence, nature now takes precedence over intellect. Therefore, anything that belongs to nature must also be conserved in intelligent subjects. However, angelic nature

has a basic predisposition, which is natural appetite. Therefore, there is a natural inclination in the intellectual nature that comes from the will. Since an angel has an intellectual nature, his will must naturally contain love (ST, I, q.60, a.1, co.). There is a contradistinction between natural love and intellectual love. Insofar as it comes from a nature that lacks the same perfection of the intellect, intellectual love differs from natural love, which is essentially natural (ST, I, q.60, a.1, ad.1).

The argument that love is natural to the angels resulting from their will in no way defiles the initial argument that angels are free beings. This is so because it might seem it is nature that is moving the angels to love rather than their will. Aquinas argued that except for the First Agent (God), who acts in such a way that He is in no way influenced by another and whose nature and will are the same, everything else in the realm of creation is spurred by something else. Therefore, insofar as this inherent inclination is imbued in them by the Creator of their nature, there is nothing contrary to the will of angels being moved to act. However, because they have free will, they are not so moved to acts that they did not take action of their own volition (ST, I, q.60, a.1, ad.2).

Aquinas tried to be specific about the form of love he is treating. There are two modes of love, the ordinate love which is a charity in nature and inordinate love which is wickedness in kind. The love natural to the angelic will is the ordinate love based on the fact that natural love consists only of the desire that the angelic nature's Creator instilled in it, natural love is always truthful, just as natural knowledge is. Saying that a natural inclination is poorly controlled or inordinate is derogatory to the Creator of the nature of the angels. The truth of natural knowledge is of one form, and the knowledge of infused or gained knowledge is of another. However, the reality of natural love is different from the truth of charity and virtue because one (charity) rectitude perfects the other (natural love) (ST, I, q.60, a.1, ad.3).

Moving forward, if we argue that there is a natural love for the angels, which is ordinate, Aquinas proposed that this love does not negate the love of choice in the angels, rather they are connected (McInerny 2016). Their innate love serves as the foundation for their love of choice because what belongs to what comes before always has the character of a principle. Determining what belongs to nature must therefore be a guiding concept in everything because nature comes first in everything. This argument is corroborated by Aristotle who says the end, which is love, has the same effects on the will that a principle has on the intellect (Physics II.89; *Ethica Nicomachea*, X, 8, 1178b–1179a). Therefore, the love of that good that an angel naturally wills is his natural love. The love that results from this, which is the love of something loved for the end, is the love of choice. There is to be found in the angels both natural love and love of choice.

The object of the angelic will is love, both natural love and that of choice the angels use on themselves, in other words, the angels love themselves both by natural love and love of choice. Everything naturally tries to acquire what is best for itself even creatures with no knowledge, just as fire seeks to ascend. As a result, both angels and humans naturally strive for self-improvement. It is about loving oneself. Since everybody inherently desires what is beneficial for itself, angels and humans both naturally love themselves. On the other hand, everyone loves himself with the love of choice insofar as he chooses something that will be to his objective (ST, I, q.60, a.3, co.). Furthermore, the angels love themselves, for that which is one is simpler than that which is united. Therefore, loving oneself brings about the simplicity of oneness more than loving others does. Though the angels love their fellow angels and humans, the love they have for themselves is stronger, but the blessed angels have superior love for God than for themselves. To “Love your neighbour as yourself” (Mark 12:31) stems from this principle of the self as more one than the unity of the neighbours, so the love of the self should be the springboard for the love of neighbours (ST, I, q.60, a.3, ad.2, Ethic. IX.8).

The angels use the object of their will namely natural love to love their fellow angels. Just as they love themselves naturally, an angel loves another angel naturally. This is based on the fact that everything loves what is at one with itself. Now, what is one with a thing is that thing itself. Therefore, if this is united to it through a natural union, it will love it with a natural love; nevertheless, if it is united to it through a non-natural union, it will love it with a non-natural love. So, while a man loves a blood relative with natural affection in the sense that they are one in the concept of natural generation, he also loves his fellow town residents with a social love. Insofar as an angel is one with another in nature, it must be argued that one angel loves another with natural affection. An angel, however, does not love another intellectual creature with natural love if they share another trait or are otherwise different from one another. Therefore, an angel does not love humans with natural love because they are not of the same nature, nor do they love the apostate angels with natural love though of the same nature, yet that of the sinner angels is corrupted (ST, I, q.60, a.4, co.).

There is a gradation of the natural love of the angels concerning themselves and their fellow angels. Because love stems from knowledge, an angel knows himself by his essence but knows another angel by similitude, therefore, one angel does not know another as himself. In the same way, he does not love another in the gradation as he loves himself since he loves himself according to his own will but not according to the will of another (ST, I, q.60, a.4, ad.1). The word "as himself" refers to similarity rather than equality (Mark 12:31) (Ethic. IX.8). Because natural oneness is the foundation for natural affection, the angel naturally loves less when anything is less one with him. As a result, he

prefers things that are numerically one with himself to those that are simply generally or specifically one. However, it is only natural for him to love another person as much as he loves himself, in the sense that he loves another person when they desire good for him (ST, I, q.60, a.4, ad.2).

The angels with their natural love, love God in a higher gradation above that which they express toward themselves. Aquinas demonstrated this point with this example: all things that naturally belong to another are principally and more strongly attracted toward that other than toward themselves in natural things. Things that are moved naturally provide evidence of an innate propensity since, as stated by Aristotle, "according to how a thing is moved naturally, it has an inborn capacity to be thus moved" (Physics II.78). For example, the hand is unintentionally exposed to the blow for the safety of the entire body. This is because we observe that the portion instinctively exposes itself to protect the whole. Since reason imitates nature, we can also observe this tendency in social virtues. After all, it is in the interest of the good citizen to risk his life for the good of the community, and if a man were a natural resident of the city, this tendency would come naturally to him. Because every creation inherently belongs to God in terms of its entirety and because God is the source of all good, which includes man, angels, and all other creatures, it follows that both angels and humans have a greater and more natural love for God. Otherwise, it would imply that natural love would be perverted and that it would not be improved but destroyed by the charity if one of them loved themselves more than God, as is the case with the wicked angels (ST, I, q.60, a.5, co.). Insofar as He is the source of all-natural goodness and the universal good, God is adored by all things. He is adored with the love of charity because He is the Good who, by being good, beautifies everyone with supernatural beatitude (ST, I, q.60, a.5, ad.4).

The Perfection of Angelic Will

By the perfection of the angelic will, we mean the reward for the appropriate use of their will. The will of the angels enjoys two forms of perfection which Aquinas refers to as the rational ultimate beatitude and the glorious ultimate beatitude. The rational ultimate beatitude is that which the angels can obtain through natural means, and it is referred to as beatitude or bliss to some degree. Because according to Aristotle, the source of man's ultimate happiness is his most perfect contemplation, which allows him to see God, the best interpretable object, in this life (Ethic. X). Aquinas supported his argument by quoting Dionysius "The angels who continue in the beatitude wherein they were created, do not of their nature possess the excellence they have" (De Eccl. Dogm. XXIX). While the glorious ultimate beatitude is the bliss, they anticipated the future when they shall see

God for who He is. They could not achieve this except with the gift of the grace of God. The fact that the angels were already blessed when they were created must thus be stated about this first beatitude, which they could obtain by their natural power. The angels are immediately in possession of such beatitude due to their intrinsic dignity because they do not acquire it via any gradual effort as man does. But concerning the second, because such beatitude is not a component of angels' nature, but rather the culmination of it, they were not endowed with it from the beginning of their creation, and as a result, they only longed for it. The will of all angels attained the first beatitude but only the blessed angels attained the second perfection (ST, I, q.62, a.1, co.).

Aquinas gave a further reason why the angels were not endowed with the glorious ultimate perfection from the instant of their being. The growing of plants from the earth did not immediately take place among the first works, in which only the germinating power of the plants was bestowed upon the earth, according to Augustine (Gen. ad. lit. V. 4.23; VIII.3). This is because the corporeal life form instantly in the outset of its creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by its operation. Similar to this, the angelic being possessed perfection in its nature at the beginning of its life, but not the perfection to which it had to go via its activity. The angels know Word in two ways, firstly, from their natural knowledge of created things they know God in similitude and this knowledge is imperfect, therefore, the love resulting from their will based on this knowledge is also imperfect. They are illuminated by God whereby they comprehend God by His essence, in this instance, perfect knowledge reflects a perfect will and a perfect love of God (ST, I, q.62, a.1, ad.3).

The angelic will is perfected by the grace of God. The angels too need grace bearing in mind that the underlying premise of whatever we will is the will's natural movement (ST, I, q.60, a.2, co.). The natural tendency of the will, though, is to gravitate toward things that are consistent with its nature. Therefore, the will cannot be bent toward anything that transcends nature unless it is assisted by another supernatural principle (ST, I, q.62, a.2, co.). It is beyond the ability of every formed intellect to see God in His essence, which is the source of the rational creature's ultimate happiness. Therefore, unless a supernatural force is used to do so, no rational being can have its will oriented towards such beatitude. We refer to this as the assistance of grace. As a result, it is necessary to state that an angel could not become such a blessing on his own without the intervention of grace (ST, I, q.62, a.2, co.). Turning their will toward God means God bestows beatitude on them by the vision of His essence (ST, I, q.62, a.2, ad.1).

Turning to God is conversion. Conversion to God is any movement of the will in His direction. There is a threefold movement to God as a result. The first is by the perfect love of God, which belongs to the creature who is in God's possession. Such conversion calls

for consummate grace. The second way of coming to God is by beatitude, and for this habitual grace, which is the basis of merit, is necessary. The third conversion is when a person positions themselves to receive grace; in this case, habitual grace is not necessary; rather, Lamentations 5:21 says that God works by drawing the soul to Himself. We are converted if God, convert us to Himself (ST, I, q.62, a.2, ad.3).

There are conflicting opinions about whether the angels were created with grace to perfect their wills. Augustine is referenced to argue that the angels were created with no grace that the angelic nature was initially created without form and was given the name "heaven," but that it later took shape and was given the name "light." But such development is the result of grace. They were not thus created in grace (Gen. ad lit. II.8). Aquinas opposed this position by also citing Augustine "Who wrought the goodwill of the angels? Who, save Him Who created them with His will, that is, with the pure love wherewith they cling to Him; at the same time building up their nature and bestowing grace on them?" (De Civ. Dei XII.9) The author in consideration went ahead to put forward his argument that it is evident that all things visible and invisible, which includes trees, animals, and the rest, were initially fashioned in the manner of seedlike forms, before being created over time by the action of Divine Providence (Gen. ad lit. VIII.3). Grace is referred to in 1 John 3:9 as the "seed" of God because it is obvious that sanctifying grace bears the same relationship to beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to the natural consequence. In the same manner that it is argued that all natural consequences were implanted in the creatures when they were created in the creature realm, therefore, Augustine believed that angels were created with the seed of grace from the very beginning (ST, I, q.62, a.3, co.).

The reception of grace is not a guarantee for the fulfillment of the purpose of the bestowing of grace by the Author of the angelic will on the angelic recipients. As a result, the operation of grace does not impose necessity unlike the operation of nature; nonetheless, a person who has received grace is still free to misuse it and commit sin (ST, I, q.62, a.3, ad.2). Also worth noting is that even while grace is placed between nature and perfection in the natural order, perfection does not occur simultaneously with nature in the created order because perfection is the result of the activity of nature aided by grace. However, because grace is not based on works but rather the principle of proper action, it does not represent the culmination of activity. Therefore, it was appropriate for grace to be bestowed alongside nature right away (ST, I, q.62, a.3, ad.3).

We should also consider whether the perfection of the angelic will and the entirety of the angelic being was merited by the angels. Let us bear in mind that only God has perfect beatitude since it comes naturally to Him because, in Him, existence and beatitude are the

same. However, goodness which is the perfection of creatures is not a part of the creature's nature; rather, it is its goal. Everything now operates toward its ultimate goal. An operation that leads to an end when the end is within the power of the agent working toward it Aquinas refers to this as a productive end, or when the end is outside the power of the agent working toward it, which is why it is sought from someone else's bestowal, he called this a merited end. It is now clear that the highest beatitude is greater than both angelic and human nature. On this fact, both man and angel merited their blessing which is the beatific vision (ST, I, q.62, a.4, co.). And this is so because they were created with grace. The contrary will be claimed that they enjoyed beatitude without merit if they had no grace before achieving beatitude.

The duration for the accomplishment of the perfection of the angelic will as treated by Aquinas relates to the number of steps required. For Aquinas, after performing their first deed of charity, which earned them beatitude, the angels were promptly beatified. As every perfection is obtained in the subject susceptible to perfection, depending on its mode, grace perfects nature following the manner of nature. Now, it is proper for the angelic nature (the will in this context) to attain its natural completeness without moving through many stages (ST, I, q.58, a.4, co.). But just as the angel is predisposed to natural perfection by nature, so too is he predisposed to glory through merit. As a result, the angel attained beatitude immediately after merit. Because man earns beatitude through every act motivated by charity, beatitude can now come from as little as one act in both angels and humans. Thus, it still stands that an angel instantly gained beatitude following one act of kindness (ST, I, q.62, a.5, co.).

The greater the natural gift of the angelic nature, the more intense use of their will and the greater their perfection or beautification. This is demonstrable in twofold measures: firstly, On the part of God, who designed several tiers in the angelic nature according to the order of His knowledge. The grades of the angelic nature now appear to conform to the various degrees of grace and glory. The angelic nature was created by God for attaining grace and beatitude. Therefore, it would seem that since God created those angels of a higher nature, He had predestined them for greater gifts of grace and greater beatitude (ST, I, q.62, a.6, co.). Second, the angel's role in this is also apparent. The angel is not a combination of various natures in which the tendency of one nullifies or retards the tendency of the other, as is the case with man, in whom the motion of his intellective side is either delayed by the tendency of his sensitive part or impeded by it. However, nature is moved with all of its force if there is nothing to hinder or obstruct it. Therefore, it makes sense to assume that the angels with better natures turned to God with their will more powerfully and effectively. The same thing occurs in mankind because they receive more grace and glory in proportion to how earnestly they turn to God (Ibid.).

It is God's will alone that ordained grace, the nature of the angels, and the various degrees of nature to the various degrees of grace for the angels (ST, I, q.62, a.6, ad.1). While it seems that a moral deed seems more closely related to grace than nature is; because a moral act is preparatory to grace. But grace does not come "of works," as is said in Romans 11:6, Aquinas thought that angelic creatures get their motivation from within, whereas nature comes directly from God. As a result, it appears that grace is more often conferred following nature than with actions (ST, I, q.62, a.6, ad.2).

Let us recall our earlier discussion on the twofold forms of beatitude; the rational ultimate beatitude and the supernatural ultimate beatitude, the consideration here is on the achievement of the supernatural ultimate beatitude which God bestows on the angels whether this depletes the natural beatitude. Aquinas tackles this issue by stating that the angels still possess love and natural wisdom after receiving the beatific vision due to the reason that beatitude is added to nature. It is now obvious that natural love is first and the second coming as a result of the first is the beatific vision. However, the first must always be maintained in the second. Therefore, nature must be preserved in goodness, and similarly, the act of nature must be preserved in goodness (ST, I, q.62, a.7, co.).

Usually, with the advent of perfection, the opposing imperfection is eliminated. But the such principle is not applicable in this instance as the imperfection of the will power underlays the perfection of its form, the imperfection of the nature of the angelic will is not in opposition to the perfection of beatitude, but rather lies beneath it. The power is not snatched away by the form, but rather by the privation that is in opposition to the form. The imperfection of natural will is also not opposed to the perfection of the will in the splendour because nothing prevents us from learning something through a variety of mediums, such as learning something simultaneously through a probable medium and a demonstrative one (ST, I, q.62, a.7, ad.1). Again, beatitude is made up of just things that are sufficient in and of themselves. But as no beatitude is self-sustaining but uncreated beatitude, they require natural gifts to survive (ST, I, q.62, a.7, ad.2.).

It will also be prudent to consider the possibility of a perfected or beatified will falling into sin or turning away from God. The sainted angels cannot sin. This is because their beatitude is based on experiencing God as His essence. The essential essence of goodness is now found only in God. As a result, the angel who sees God has the same attitude toward God as someone who does not perceive God toward the common kind of goodness. The beatified angels are incapable of doing or willing anything other than toward God. Now, no one who wills or acts in this way can sin. As a result, the beatified angel is sinless (ST, I, q.62, a.8, co.). Created well might fall short when taken on its own.

However, due to its flawless union with the uncreated Good, specifically the union of beatitude, it is incapable of sinning (ST, I, q.62, a.8, ad.1).

The will is inherently ordained to good as its rightful purpose, it cannot help but adhere to good, formally as good, just as the mind cannot help but assent to naturally known principles. As a result, the will of the angels is described in terms of opposites, such as doing many things or refraining from doing them. However, they do not exhibit any tendency toward an opposition about God, whom they perceive to be the absolute essence of virtue; rather, they aspire for God in everything, regardless of which option they select that is not wicked (ST, I, q.62, a.8, ad.2).

Still, further, it is great to bear in mind that while God leads the angels to Himself which is the beatific vision, the corresponding natural degree to the degree of the beatific vision by the angels of God is not progressive but determinate. Because intention always aims toward the end, to which endless progress is inimical, every movement the mover makes focuses on a single predetermined goal to which he wishes to take the movable subject. As a result, every rational creature must be steered toward a single predetermined thing to reach its ultimate goal (ST, I, q.62, a.9, co.). The Supreme Truth is seen by all the blessed in varying degrees, therefore this one set object cannot, in the vision of God, consist exactly in that which is seen. However, on the part of the method of vision, numerous terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of Him Who steers towards the end. Since only God has understanding, the rational creature can't be led to the supreme mode of vision in the same way that it is led to the vision of the Supreme Essence (ST, I, q.12, a.7, co.; ST, I, q.14, a.3, co.). Since beatific vision is what makes the angels blessed, their level of vision depends on their particular mode of vision. Due to God's predestination, every rational creature is thereby guided to the pinnacle of its beatitude in such a way that it reaches a specific level of beatitude. As a result, after obtaining the degree, it cannot be increased (ST, I, q.62, a.9, co.).

The Sinful Use of Angelic Will and Immorality

Having discussed the nature of the angelic will, the object of the will, its perfection and reward for the appropriate use, it is fitting to see also, how its misuse is immoral or sinful. An angelic being, viewed in the context of his nature, is capable of sin. Any creature to which it does not belong to sin, however, has it as a gift of grace rather than as a result of his or her inherent nature. The explanation for this is that sin, whether it be in nature, art, or morals, is nothing more than a departure from the propriety that an act ought to possess. That act alone can never fall short of morality because it is governed by the agent's very virtue. If the craftsman's hand were the engraving rule itself, he could only etch the wood correctly; but, if the engraving's correctness is determined by another rule,

the engraving may be correct or incorrect. Since there is no reference to a higher purpose, the Divine will now serve as the only guide for God's actions. However, every created will only have the moral right to act insofar as it is guided by the Divine will, to which the ultimate goal is to be preferred. For example, every desire of a subordinate should be guided by the will of his superior; for instance, the will of a soldier should be guided by the will of his commanding officer. Since sin can exist in every creature's will according to the nature of that creature, it can exist only in defiance of the Divine will (ST, I, q.63, a.9, co.). There is potential in the angels' intellectual part concerning their propensity for moral or immoral deeds. They have the potential to be evil in this regard (ST, I, q.63, a.1, ad.1).

The conduct of free will results in mortal sin in two different ways. First, when something immoral is selected, such as when a man chooses adultery, which is evil in and of itself, to sin. Because what is sinful would never be chosen as good, such sin always results from ignorance or mistake. This does not specifically apply to angels, but rather to mankind. Second, sin results from exercising free will and choosing something inherently good but not following proper guidelines or standards. As a result, the flaw that results in sin only affects the part (the angel) of the choice that is improperly regulated rather than on the part of the object chosen, similar to when someone prays but disregards the Church's established tradition. Such a sin just involves failing to take into account the elements that should be taken into account and does not imply ignorance. The angel sinned in this fashion by acting against the dictates of the Divine Choice in pursuit of his good out of his own free will (ST, I, q.63, a.1, ad.4).

In the angelic subject, sin might manifest in two different ways: first, through actual guilt, and second, by affection. Regarding guilt, all sins belong to demons because they are responsible for all misdeeds by persuading mortals to commit them. However, when it comes to affection, only crimes of a spiritual origin can be found in demons. Since nothing is influenced unless about something that is in some manner in line with its nature, a spiritual nature cannot be impacted by pleasures that pertain to bodies but only by those that are in line with spiritual things. However, when someone is inspired to act in the interests of the spiritual order, there can be no sin—unless, of course, the superior's rules are not upheld. To refuse to submit to a superior when it is necessary is exactly the sin of pride. So, it stands to reason that pride must be the angel's first sin (ST, I, q.63, a.2, co.).

Aside from the sin of pride that can be committed by an angelic entity, envy is the second sin of the fallen angels. As hunger tends to the want of something, it also involves on its part resistance to anything contrary, envy could be in them as a result of pride. Since one

believes that his neighbour's good impedes his own, the envious subject now laments the good that another possesses. However, unless the evil angel desired a unique excellence that would lose its uniqueness due to the excellence of another, another's good could not be seen as impeding the good the wicked angel desired. As a result, the sin of pride was followed by the sin of envy in the guilty angels, who were grieved by both the goodness of man, their fellow angels, and the excellence of God because contrary to the devils' will, God uses mortals for the glory of God (Ibid.).

Having established in our discussion the possibility of the evil angels sinning pride, this pride was manifested in their desire to be like the subject Author of their existence. To desire to be as God would either mean equality with Him or in likeness to Him. But to share equality with God is impossible for the angelic nature because they were aware that this was unattainable from a natural point of view. Even if it were feasible, it would go against the natural desire because everything has the urge to maintain its unique nature, which would not be kept if it were to shift into a different nature, and for a transition of such nature to occur, it would mean the cessation of the angelic nature but a subject cannot cease to exist and then take a higher nature since nothingness is incapable of taking action (ST, I, q.63, a.3, co.).

Since the devils did not seek equality with God, let us see how they sought likeness to God. There are two ways that one can seek to resemble God. First, let's talk about the analogy that is used to compare everything to God. If someone aspires to be like God in this way, they are not sinful as long as they do so in the right way—that is, by asking God for it. However, he would sin if he sought to emulate God even in the proper way, acting independently of God's authority. Second, it's possible to have an irrational desire to resemble God in some way. For example, one can have the urge to create heaven and earth, which is fitting for God, and this desire would be sinful. The devil wanted to be like God in this manner. He didn't want to resemble God by being completely subservient to no one else because if he did, he would be craving his own "not-being". After all, only by holding its existence beneath God can a creature exist. However, he sought to resemble God by shifting his appetite away from the kind of beatitude that can only be gained through the gift of God and instead seeking something that he might achieve through the virtue of his nature. Alternatively, if he strove to achieve the likeness of God that is imparted by grace as his ultimate goal, he did so through the force of his nature rather than through divine assistance following God's will (Ibid.).

The angelic will by nature is good and this includes the nature of the will of the rebellious angels too. No angel was created with evil will. Everything that exists, to the extent that it exists and has a specific nature, tends naturally in the direction of some good since everything is based on a good principle and because an effect always returns to its

underlying principle cause. Now, a specific good can have some evil associated with it; for example, fire has evil associated with it that destroys other things, but no evil can be associated with the universal good. Then, if there is anything whose nature tends towards a certain good, it may accidentally trend toward a certain evil—not as wrong, but as connected to a certain good. But if something has a tendency toward good in general, it cannot have a tendency toward evil by nature (ST, I, q.63, a.4, co.). As of right now, it is clear that every intellectual essence tends to favour good in general, which it can understand and favours as the object of the will. Therefore, since demons are intellectual beings, they cannot by any means have a natural propensity for any kind of evil; they therefore cannot be naturally bad (Ibid.). Porphyry is rebuked by Augustine for claiming that demons are naturally wicked; Augustine maintains that this is not true and that they are instead acting of their own volition (De Civ. Dei X.11).

Now that we have argued the nature of the inappropriate use of the angelic will, let us turn to the time they sinned. There was an argument concerning the instant when the angels sinned. Some held that they sinned in the first instant of their being. While others objected holding to the opinion that they sinned subsequently but not in their first instant. A third opinion was that it is impossible to instantly terminate one's course of deed to initiate another. Aquinas intervened to express his view on the debate. For him, the second opinion is plausible and he gave the following reasons: for the third opinion he replied that when a change is followed by a local movement, neither the change nor the local movement may end simultaneously. The first and second modifications, however, might occur simultaneously and in the same instant if the changes are instantaneous. For example, the moon and the atmosphere are both illuminated by the sun at the same time (ST, I, q.63, a.5, co.).

And to the first opinion, he responded that the sin committed by the angels happened after they were created. To argue that some sinned at the first instant of their existence is absurd. There is one act, not multiple acts of the angels' first instant which is the act of the angels' very existence meaning their very first act is their very existence. Therefore, it appears impossible that the angel could have been evil from the very beginning of his life. Although something can act immediately, the action that starts with existence derives from the source from which it derived its character, much as an upward movement in a fire originates from its creative cause. Therefore, everything that gets its nature from a flawed cause might also be the reason for a flawed action. Sin, however, cannot be the result of the same Entity that created the angels—namely, God. Therefore, it is impossible to argue that the devil was malevolent from the moment of his creation. As a result, the angel could not have sinned the first instant by exercising excessive free will (Ibid.).

Obedience was the second act of the beatified angels and the sin of pride was the second act of the apostate angels.

Now established that the sinner angels did not fall at the first instant of their being, would it then be proper to assert that there was some time frame between their creation and fall? This must be upheld if it is believed that they were formed in grace and that they exercised free will from the moment of his creation (ST, I, q.62, a.3, co.). Because the angels achieve beatitude with a single act of merit (ST, I, q.62, a.5, co.), if the devils, who were formed in grace, had merited in the initial instant, he would have attained beatitude immediately after that first instant had he not created an obstacle by sinning (ST, I, q.63, a.6, co.).

Insofar as time is a continuum, in this regard, it is accurate to claim that there is an intermediate period between every two instants (Physics VI.2.). Time is understood about the angels as the succession of an angel's mental acts or affections since they are not susceptible to the heavenly motion, which is largely measured by continuous time. Because the evening is stated on the first day but not the morning, it is assumed that the first instant in angels corresponds to the activity of the angelic mind, which self-reflects by using its knowledge of the evening. In each case, this procedure worked well (ST, I, q.63, a.6, ad.4.). Some of them, as a result of this action, were changed to the adoration of the Word by their morning knowledge, but others caught up in themselves and "swelling up with pride," as Augustine says, became night (Gen. ad lit. IV.24.). As a result, they all participated in the first act together, but their second act divided them. As a result, they were all good in the first instant; yet, in the second, the good ones were distinguished from the evil ones (ST, I, q.63, a.6, ad.4.).

As we have considered earlier, some angels were created receiving more natural grace than others, therefore, there is a hierarchy among the angels. Considering the wrongful use of their will, would it be illogical to propose that the greater angels by natural endowment sinned more than the lower angels? There arises two a set of opinions in the consideration of this question. First, is the propensity for sin, if we then consider the angels' propensity for sin, it would appear that the higher angels had a lower propensity for sin than the lower ones. The second is the motive for sinning. When sin's motivation is taken into account, we see that higher angels were more likely to have it than lower ones. The sin of the demons was pride, and pride has as its motivation for excellence, which was greater in the higher evil spirits. Because of this, the greatest sinner was the highest of all. Because the sin of the angels was only the result of free will and not any predisposition, this seems to be the most likely of the two theories. As a result, the argument that is based on the reason for sinning seems to have more weight. But this shouldn't be used against the opposing viewpoint, since the leader of the lower angels

could have had a reason for sin (ST, I, q.63, a.7, co.). The highest of the ranks of the angels that fell are those in the order of the cherubim. Seraphim means "those who are aflame fire" or "who set on fire," while Cherubim is translated as full of knowledge. Because of this, Seraphim are created from the heat of charity, which is incompatible with mortal sin, while Cherubim is derived from knowledge, which is compatible with mortal sin. As a result, the first fallen angel is referred to as a Cherub rather than a Seraph (ST, I, q.63, a.7, ad.1).

The higher angels influence lower angels either to turn toward God or to turn toward evil. The highest angels moved lower angels to sin, not as commanding inferior angels to sin, but by enticing them through a form of exhortation, which was what led to the other angels' sin. It may be shown from our Lord's words, "'Depart from Me, you cursed, into eternal fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels,' that all demons are servants of that highest one (Matt. 25:41). Since (2 Pet. 2:19) says that "By whom a man is overwhelmed, of the same likewise he is the slave," it follows that whoever agrees to another's wicked suggestion will be subject to him in his punishment (ST, I, q.63, a.8, co.). Even if all of the demons committed evil at once, one sin could have led to others sinning as well. Because unlike a man, who needs to deliberate to choose and assent, and vocal discourse to exhort—both of which take time to accomplish—an angel does not require a delay of time for choosing, exhortation, or consent. And it is clear that even man speaks at the same moment that he thinks and that at the very last moment of speaking, someone who understands what was said might agree with it. This is particularly true of primary conceptions, "which everyone accepts when they are heard." (ST, I, q.63, a.8, ad.1) Therefore, by eliminating the time needed for speech and consideration on our part, the other angels could agree in the same instant that the highest angel proclaimed his affection through understandable words (Ibid.).

The Punishments for the Immorality of the Angels

There is a corresponding punishment due for every sin committed and the angels are not excluded, so we intend to discuss how Aquinas treated the punishment of the sinner angels. Their punishments affect their intellect and their will. One of the punishments for the immorality of the apostate angels is the privation of knowledge or truth. There are two ways to know the truth: first is that which comes from nature, this first wasn't diminished or taken away from the demons. Since the angel is an intellect or mind by definition, it follows that nothing can be taken from him due to the simplicity of his nature, making it unlikely to punish him by taking away from his natural abilities the way a man is punished by being stripped of a hand, foot, or other physical attributes (Div. Nom. IV). As

a result, their inherent knowledge was unaffected. Second is the knowledge of the truth which comes from grace. The knowledge that results from grace is further divided into two categories: one is merely speculative, as when Divine mysteries are revealed to the angels; this knowledge has not been completely taken away from them, but it has been diminished because only the necessary amount of these Divine mysteries are disclosed to them, and that is done via the angels or "through some corporeal realities of Divine power" (De Civ. Dei IX, 21.). However, this revelation is not to the same extent as that which is given to the holy angels, to whom the Word Himself reveals a greater number of things and in greater detail. The other is practical and fosters the love for God, and thus rightfully belongs to the category of wisdom gifts. But they are completely devoid of the third knowledge as well as a charity (ST, I, q.64, a.1, co.).

Even an angel cannot of his power understand the nature of God. However, because of the perfection of his intellect, he can naturally have a greater understanding of God than a man can. Demons still possess this same understanding of God. They still have in some measure purity of nature, which is sufficient enough for the knowledge of God that is theirs by nature even though they lack the purity that comes with grace (ST, I, q.64, a.1, ad.2.).

The knowledge of the angels' nature is referred to as "evening" knowledge since the angels pale in comparison to the magnificence of the Divine light. Even though the evening is similar to darkness, it still has some light; nonetheless, when the light completely disappears, it becomes night. Therefore, knowledge of things in their natural state when related to the glorification of the Creator, as it is in good angels, has a hint of Divine light and can be termed as evening knowledge; however, if it is unrelated to God, as it is with demons, it is not alluded to as evening knowledge but rather as "nocturnal" knowledge. Accordingly, we learn in Genesis 1:5 that "He called the night" the darkness that God created after dividing it from the light (ST, I, q.64, a.1, ad.3).

As mentioned already, they are deprived of a certain knowledge which they might have a clue of from corporeal effects. This deprivation serves as a means of punishment for them in this manner that the mystery of God's kingdom, which was fully revealed in Christ, was something that all the angels were aware of from the beginning. However, this knowledge increased significantly once they were beatified by the vision of the Word, which the devils were never given. However, not every angel comprehended it entirely and equally, and as a result, the devils were considerably less able to fully comprehend the mystery of the Incarnation throughout Christ's time in the world (ST, I, q.64, a.1, co.). Because, as Augustine notes, "it was made known to them by some temporal results, to strike horror into them, and it was not disclosed to them as it was to the celestial angels, who enjoy a participating eternity of the Word." (De Civ. Dei IX.21) Because they would never have

achieved the crucifixion of the Lord of glory if they had fully and unquestionably understood that He was the Son of God and the result of His passion.

The wicked angels are punished for the wrongful use of their will by limiting their knowledge of the truth in threefold measures. First, they are aware of it because of the subtlety of their nature. They lack the light of grace and are limited to the illuminated by the light of their intellectual nature. Second, they are confined to receiving revelation from the holy angels and not from God directly, formerly greater angels are now taught by naturally inferior celestial angels; even though they do not share their will, they do have a similar intellectual nature and are therefore able to accept what is manifested by others: Thirdly, they scramble to have knowledge gained over time, not as a result of their senses, but rather as a result of the completion of the similitude of their innately intelligent species in particular things. As a result, they know some things that they did not previously know would occur, and they know them to be true now (ST, I, q.64, a.1, ad.5).

The punishment for the sin of the angels is also reflected in the will of the wicked angels in that their will is obstinate in evil. We must be aware that the root of this obstinacy, is not in the severity of the transgression, but in their character or state. The difference between the angel's and man's perception is that the angel perceives immovably through intelligence, but man perceives movably by reason, moving from one thought to another, and having the option of going in either direction between two opposites. As a result, unlike the angel's will, which adheres intently and immovably, man's will is movable and can cling to something and it can also let go of it. As a result, if their will is taken into account before adhesion, they can freely adhere to either this or its opposite; yet, once they have adhered, they cling irretrievably. Since man's free will is malleable to the opposite before and after a decision, it is conventional to state that angels' free will is only malleable to the opposite before choice but not afterwards. As a result, those virtuous angels who upheld justice were vindicated therein, as opposed to the evil ones, who persist in sinning (ST, I, q.64, a.2, co.). The wicked angels are punished for rejecting God's mercy by refusing to repent because they are clinging fixedly and immovably to sin (ST, I, q.64, a.2, ad.2).

They are sentenced to sorrow in this way that the only thing that can be used to describe a simple act of will is resistance to what is or is not. Since they would prefer humans to be damned, mortals are saved and this causes them sorrow. The demons would yearn for some things to be true and God makes them false and others to be false and God causes them sorrow by making them true. Therefore, it is necessary to assert that they experience sadness, particularly because this way of punishment offends their will which seek happiness. Additionally, they are denied the happiness they naturally seek because their

evil nature is in many ways restrained (ST, I, q.64, a.3, co.). They are in the present experiencing sorrow yet have fear for the future for a further evil to befall them as the demons asked Jesus “Have you come to destroy us before time?” (Matt. 8:29) (ST, I, q.64, a.3, ad.2).

Another form of punishment results from their envy of humans, due to their envy they tempt mortals to sin, which God, in turn, uses for our good. The divine plan of things is already set up in such a way that it ensures the welfare of the subordinate orders via the superior. However, divine providence deals with man's welfare in two different ways: first, directly, when a man is led toward good and kept away from evil, which is suitably accomplished by good angels. Alternatively, indirectly, as when someone who is being attacked works out by battling against adversity our victory over them humiliates them which serves as punishment while denying them the accomplishment of their will. To prevent them from losing their usefulness to the natural order, it was appropriate for this to be accomplished through the use of demonic forces (ST, I, q.64, a.3, co.). As a result, the demons are entitled to two different places of punishment: one of such places for their wickedness is hell, and another is the earth for the tempting of humans; as a result, the dark and foreboding environment is where they should be punished (Ibid.).

Conclusion

Certain conclusions can be drawn from our discussion so far, firstly, the angels are creatures with will faculty and endowed with the inclination that moves them toward the ultimate object of the appetite of their will which is Goodness itself—God. The object of their will is presented to their perception by the object of their intellect which is the truth because you cannot love what you do not know. The ultimate object of their intellect is Truth itself which is also God. Love as the object of their will is sought after both by natural inclination and by the love of choice. The natural inclination is the movement of the will and love of choice is the means of movement chosen by the will.

The angels are creatures of love who are capable of loving themselves naturally and by the love of choice. They likewise love all creatures of the same essence with themselves naturally though not up to the degree they love themselves and this is because they do not know other angels as they know themselves. They also love other creatures not of the same essence as them for instance humans but their affection for humans is none natural as they do to themselves and their fellow angels. Lastly, they love God more than they supernaturally love themselves through the gift of God's grace.

As creatures of will the angels gravitate towards beatitude. They achieve beatitude on two plains. The first is that which they achieve with their natural power, it is the ultimate

realization of their natural ability and this both the sinner and celestial angels participate. The second ultimate beatitude is that which they achieve by the vision of the essence of God, this comes to them through the grace of God. The angels are gifted natural grace at the instant of their creation which is imperfect grace for the achievement of their natural beatitude, and they receive consummated grace when they possess supernatural beatitude. The grace they receive at creation is the seed of grace planted in them and the fruition of this grace is accomplished when they have the beatific vision.

The angels did not fall at the first instant of their being, because the first instant of their being is their very existence which is brought about through the creative act of God, and since God is supremely good and all He created is good, saying that the angels fell at the first instant of their being would imply that God created the angels evil. The angels rather fell at the instant of their first act of the will when they decided to turn away from God. Yet there was no time interval between when they were created and when they fell, for a time about the angel's concerns with their activities and not the motion of heavenly bodies. Since their first deed was evil there was no corporeal time interval between their creation and their fall. The highest rank of the angels who sinned is the one from the order of the Cherubim and he influenced those beneath him to rebel, therefore, no angel from the rank of the Seraphim fell. The greater the angelic being the greater the sin and this stems from the fact of their motivation to greatest rather than the propensity to sin.

They are punished in their intellect by their limitation to only what is accessible to their natural powers, they might receive divine revelation but with limited knowledge, and they are relegated to scramble for divine mysteries from corporeal things. They are punished in their will by making sure that that which they will is never truly accomplished.

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