

ADDRESSING MARGINALISATION AND POLITICAL INJUSTICE: THE CASE FOR ROTATIONAL PRESIDENCY IN NIGERIA"

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Abstract

This study critically examined the contentious notion of 'rotational presidency in Nigeria'. While some proponents argue that the competence of presidents should be considered against their regional origin, others contend that such a stance may have misleading consequences. Notably, since the 60-year-old existence of Nigeria as a Republic, the Northern region has produced more presidents and dominated national leadership for 40 years, raising concerns about whether the best is only found therein. The study employed a time series research design and documentary method to collect both qualitative and quantitative data from secondary sources. Using the content method of analyses, the work addressed and redressed the impacts of marginalisation and political injustice on Nigeria's democracy. This research, therefore, advocates for the rotation of the presidency among all geopolitical zones of Nigeria to foster equity and fairness and also to exploit diverse leadership qualities to necessitate Nigeria's socio-economic and political development. The study concludes that ensuring a balanced representation in the nation's apex office will reduce political violence, address ethno-religious agitations, and ultimately contribute to the stability and prosperity of Nigeria's often troubled democracy.

Keywords: Rotational Presidency, Nigeria, Marginalisation, Political Injustice.

Introduction

A chequered history has characterised Nigerian politics. After going through British Rule from 1861 to 1960, the young nation adopted a federal system of government and its attendant parliamentarism, through which Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa became the first prime minister. This birthed the first federal republic in 1963, leading to Dr Nnamdi Azikwe's ceremonial presidency. However, Nigeria surprisingly started to experience ethnic tensions and political instability in its infancy, resulting in several bloody and bloodless military coups. The significant but failed Biafran secession from Nigeria during the civil war that lasted from 1967-1970 during the reign of

Major General Yakubu Gowon is a proof of the country's democratic nightmare and still leaves an imprint in the current polity of Nigeria.

There were several attempts to reinstate a democratic government which punctuated the military regimes. Of all, the Obasanjo-Shagari military-civilian transition succeeded first but was truncated by another military coup led by General Muhammadu Buhari in December 1983. The nation underwent several other military coups, rules, and reforms, however, none of them was able to place the country in its desired sustainable political trajectory, not until 1999 when Gen Abdulsallami Abubakar eventually handed the government over to President Olusegun Obasanjo for a sustainable civilian rule. Following the political history of Nigeria, the need for political stability, equity and fair play cannot be overemphasised.

As Obi 2017 opins, the issue of ethnicity and religiosity are found to be the topmost cause of Nigeria's political inequality and instability and they are rooted in Nigeria's history, culture, and political institutions. As a multi-ethnic nation, political equity and justice are crucial for Nigeria's progress, social harmony, economic development, and democratic consolidation (Adelana, 2022). The foundation for inclusive governance, economic growth, and positive international relations, which are crucial for the well-being and prosperity of any nation and its citizenry are lacking in 21st-century Nigeria. Hence, this paper examines the role of rotational presidency in addressing the problems of marginalisation and political injustice.

Research Design and Methodology

The study employed a time series research design to analyse political trends. It utilised a qualitative approach and collected data through the documentary method. Secondary data were obtained from textbooks, journals, conference papers and internet resources. The study adopted content analysis and systematic logical induction to analyse the collected data.

Conceptual Clarifications: Rotational Presidency, Marginalisation and Political Injustice:

1. Rotational presidency is a system of government in which the office of the president is rotated between different regions or ethnic groups. This system is often used in countries with a history of ethnic or regional conflict, as it can help to promote

- peace and stability by ensuring that all groups have a fair share of power.
2. Marginalisation is the social exclusion of individuals or groups from full participation in society. This can be due to a variety of factors, including race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, disability, or socioeconomic status. Marginalised groups are often denied access to resources and opportunities, and they may experience discrimination and violence. They may also be stigmatised and stereotyped.
 3. Political Injustice is a concept that refers to the unfair and unequal distribution of political power and influence. It is often contrasted with political equality, which simply means that all citizens have the same legal rights and opportunities to participate in the political process.

Conceptual Framework

Rotational Presidency

As described by Hartzel and Hoddie (2003), a political power-sharing agreement mandates or facilitates the participation of a broad set of decision-makers in government. The parties to such agreements are usually ethnic groups, political parties, armed forces, or other organisations representing social groups with opposing interests (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007). Power Sharing aims to ensure that no groups, and ideally no citizens, suffer policies that are seriously detrimental to their interests.

The two basic principles of rotational presidency are equity and fairness. The principle of equity preaches that all regions or ethnic groups should have an equal opportunity to hold the office of president by rotating the presidency between different regions or ethnic groups, or by setting quotas for the number of presidents from each region or ethnic group. The principle of fairness means that the best candidate for the presidency should be elected. This can be achieved by using a fair electoral system, such as a single transferable vote system, which allows voters to rank their preferences for candidates.

Marginalisation and Political Injustice

According to Causadias and Taylor (2018), marginalisation is a multifaceted, dynamic, context-dependent, and diversified web of processes that has probabilistic implications for development, is anchored in power imbalance, and is systematically targeted at particular groups and individuals.

Political injustice, on the other hand, is the denial of political rights to individuals or groups. Among them are the freedoms to vote, hold public office, and take part in political activities. According to Gaus and Shoelandt 2018, political injustice stems from marginalizations inherent in political institutions and for societies to quell such, members of top political bodies must, in tandem with the social contract theory, seek terms with which all can live, albeit such terms may not be their most preferred possibility (Van Schoelandt and Gaus 2018).

Marginalisation and political injustice are often interconnected. For example, marginalised groups are often denied political representation, which can make it difficult for them to advocate for their respective interests. This can lead to further marginalisation, as these groups are unable to participate in the political process and have their voices heard. The consequences of marginalisation and political injustice in a given society include but are not limited to increased poverty and inequality, reduced access to social amenities, increased crime and violence, social unrest and total instability.

Historical Overview of Nigeria's Political System

The political system in Nigeria has evolved since its independence from the colonial rule of Great Britain on October 1, 1960. The first republic existed from 1960-1966 when Nigeria eagerly embraced its new status as a parliamentary democracy with a post-independent structure of federalism. Before independence, the country witnessed the rise of prominent political parties such as the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), led by Nnamdi Azikiwe, the Northern People's Congress (NPC), led by Sir Ahmadu Bello; and the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo; In this era, some ethnic inclinations already began to crystallise. However, they made concerted efforts that fostered the Nigerian independence of 1960 through agitations by labour movements and cultural organisations.

After gaining independence, a federal structure was constituted in 1963 that led Nigeria to being a republic for the first time. However, the First Republic faced challenges like ethnic and regional tensions, corruption, and political instability, which eventually led to a military coup in 1966. (Onwuatuegwu, 2020).

Following the coup, Nigeria experienced a tumultuous period marked by a series of military coups and counter-coups. Major General Yakubu

Gowon assumed power and led the country through the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), which aimed to address the secessionist aspirations of the southeastern region (Biafra). After the war, General Gowon initiated plans to transition Nigeria back to civilian rule but was overthrown in 1975 by General Murtala Ramat Mohammed. However, his tenure was short-lived as he was assassinated the following year, leading to General Olusegun Obasanjo taking charge and overseeing the transition to civilian rule.

The Second Republic began in 1979 with the adoption of a new constitution and the return to civilian rule. During this period, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), led by President Shehu Shagari, held significant sway in the political landscape. However, economic challenges, corruption, and political unrest plagued the era, culminating in another military coup in 1983.

The military once again assumed power in 1983 through a coup led by General Muhammadu Buhari. Nigeria witnessed a series of military governments, with frequent leadership changes, as the nation grappled with its challenges. General Ibrahim Babangida came to power in 1985 and introduced a transition program aimed at returning Nigeria to civilian rule. This process faced a major setback when the presidential elections held on June 12, 1993, were controversially annulled. General Sani Abacha took power in 1993 and ruled until he died in 1998, paving the way for the eventual return to civilian rule.

The Fourth Republic dawned in 1999 when Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military head of state, was elected as President under the banner of the People's Democratic Party (PDP). This marked Nigeria's triumphant return to democracy after years of military rule. Since then, Nigeria has witnessed the rotation of power between different political parties and presidents. The political system follows a presidential model, featuring a multi-party system and periodic elections at the federal, state, and local levels.

Rotational Presidency, Marginalisation and Injustice in Nigerian Politics

During the tenure of the late Gen. Sani Abacha, the Rotational Presidency concept was first established in Nigeria through a National Constitutional Convention held in 1995. At the conference, it was decided to divide the country into six geo-political zones and to fill national political positions through a rotation system that would ensure equal representation from each zone. This rotational principle was

meant to be included in the Draft Constitution and applied across all levels of government, with a provision for a transitional period lasting 30 years (Njoku, 2005). However, this plan did not see the daylight as obviously, it is absent in the 1999 constitution.

Furthermore, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC), Nigeria's two most powerful political parties, are committed to justice, equity, and fairness in their respective constitutions. According to Okwudiri and Ugwuera (2014), the policy of rotation and zoning was enshrined in the PDP constitution (Article 7.2 (c)) but had various lacunae that made it vulnerable to manipulations by the party's executive and zoning committees, respectively. Hence, the idea of zoning was not once again effectively practised during the sixteen-year rule of the PDP let alone being sustained in the nation's politics. In the same vein, Article 20 (e) of the APC constitution clearly states:

“Without prejudice to Article 20(u) and (iii) of this Constitution, the National Working Committee shall subject to the approval of the National Executive Committee make Rules and Regulations for the nomination of Candidates through primary elections, All such Rules, Regulations and Guidelines shall take into consideration and uphold the principle of Federal Character, gender balance, geo-political spread and rotation of offices, to as much as possible ensure balance within the Constituency covered” (APC Constitution, Article 20 {e})

Just as in the case of PDP, the constitution did not make clear provisions on the modalities of enforcing the rule, subjecting it further to manipulations and misinterpretations. From the purview, it is obvious that the principle of rotational presidency or zoning, as seen by major Nigerian political institutions, is only a charade used by political elites and is robbed of its earlier stated principles which are equity, justice and fairness. To underscore this, the political marginalisation of some geopolitical zones is glaring in the post-independent and post-military regimes of the Nigerian government as contained in Tables 1.1 and 1.2.

Table 1.1: Geopolitical Zones of Nigeria's Presidents from 1963 to 1999

S/N	Geopolitical Zone	Tenure (years)
1	North-West	11
2	South-West	4
3	North-Central	18
4	South-East	199 days

Source: Wikipedia ("List of heads of state of Nigeria", 2023)

Table 1.2: Geopolitical Zones of Nigeria's Presidents from 1999 to 2022

S/N	Geopolitical Zone	Tenure (years)
1	South-West	8
2	North-West	11
3	South-South	6

Source: Wikipedia ("List of heads of state of Nigeria", 2023)

From the tables 1.1 and 1.2 above, the Northern zones of the country had held national leadership for a total of 40 years out of the 60 years that Nigeria had existed as a republic. Breaking the figures down, the Northwestern zone has ruled more than any other for 22 years, both in the military and civilian regimes (Murtala Mohammed, Shehu Shagari, Sani Abacha and Muhammadu Buhari). Their runner-up, the Northcentral zone dominated the military regime with a total of an 18-year rule (Yakubu Gowon, Ibrahim Babangida, and Abdulsalami Abubakar). Third position Southwest had had their fair share of a total 12-year rule (Olusegun Obasanjo's double tenures both as a General and a civilian and the few months of Chief Ernest Shonekan). At

present, they have another potential 4-year addition if the incumbent president Bola Ahmed Tinubu completes his tenure. The South-south managed to clinch the fourth position through the 6-year reign of Goodluck Jonathan. The Southeastern part only got a glimpse of the apex position through Gen Aguiyi's Ironsi's short military regime. Note that the ceremonial leadership of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (Southeast), ran concurrently with the Prime Ministership of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Northeast) from 1963-1966. Therefore, the Southeast and Northeast zones of the country have fallen through the cracks in Nigerian apex leadership, raising the national question of whether they are no longer part of Nigeria. Little wonder, disruptive agitations sprout from the last three zones stated above.

According to a study conducted by Olaiya et al (2014), over 70% of the legislators out of a sample size of 150 believe that without the zoning principle, there is a potential for the government apparatus to be manipulated by a particular ethnic group and therefore support the zoning principle as a means to resolve these contentions and establish a lasting peace. In support, Akinola (1996) cited in Ambali and Mohammed (2016) argue that since 1960, the main source of conflict in the Nigerian polity has been several failed attempts by the country to base its democracy on foreign political systems instead of seeking a system of governance best applicable to its unique multi-ethnic, religious and cultural state.

A glimmer of hope came when the 1995 National Constitutional Conference tried to change this status quo by adopting a rotational presidency. It seemed a practical solution to address the contention since it reduced concerns about ethnic dominance in the presidency. However, the absence of the rotation principle in the Nigerian Constitution left it devoid of long-term sustainability. Fast forward to 2023, the internal PDP and APC architecture of zoning was jettisoned in 2022, when the parties decided to throw the presidential ticket open in their primary elections, after practising the same for years, buttressing the point that is only tool used when it seemed favourable and not according to the rule of law. Thus, Akinola et al (1996) asserted that the absence of power rotation in the Nigerian constitution and the inadequate adherence to the principle of rotation by political parties significantly contribute to political violence, instability, and the underdevelopment of Nigeria.

Some authors criticise rotating the presidency among geopolitical zones because they believe it may lead to conflict among states of a zone over which state produces candidates. Olugbade (1992: 320) also expressed concerns about introducing further problems into the country's federation through zoning. On the other hand, some suggest that instead of implementing zoning, the focus should be on empowering the marginalised people of Nigeria economically and politically for development (Abubakar, 1998: 173). In relation, Adelana (2022) suggests that power rotation, regime change, or power shifts based on geopolitical or ethno-religious considerations may not effectively address the challenges of insecurity and secession agitations in Nigeria. He explores the concept of political power rotation in Nigeria's fourth republic and its relationship with security and integration challenges and argues that while power rotation is believed to promote fairness and mitigate fears of majority tyranny, the focus should shift towards cultivating good leadership qualities such as vision, integrity, and the ability to unite people. The study emphasises that Nigeria needs improved security, lasting peace, ethno-religious harmony, nation-building, and democratic sustainability. It suggests that the real problem lies not in the ethnic or regional origin of the President but in the inter-class conflicts for control of state power. Ultimately, it highlights the importance of practising good governance and transcending regional divisions for Nigeria's progress and socio-political stability.

Having evaluated the arguments of various authors who are for and against the principle of presidential power rotation, this research deduces that while the minority of authors in the discourse posit that rotational presidency is not the solution to, or may exacerbate Nigeria's problems of inequity and marginalisation, the majority agree that it is a panacea for peace, justice, equity, good governance and development, recommending that it should be enshrined in the constitution. However, little or no further studies have delved into the intricacies of what the policy should contain. Considering the negligence and calculated manipulations of the power rotation proposition by the major political parties, even though it is contained in their constitutions, this work contends that the mere constitutionalisation of rotational presidency is inadequate to address the problems of marginalisation and political injustice in the country. Hence, the relevance of this research.

Some Ethnic and Regional Agitations in Nigeria:

The marginalisation and political injustice as x-rayed in the

analysis above have orchestrated significant and seemingly intractable ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria since it attained independence in 1960. The most notable conflict was the Nigerian-Biafran war which according to Onwuatuegwu (2020) has remained a dark point in the history of human civilization in Nigeria and Africa, leaving a death toll of over 2,000,000 (Onuoha, 2016). The impact of other prominent regional conflicts, involving various separatist and militant groups, influenced the country's political stability are evaluated below:

1. Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (2004-2014)

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was one of the largest militia organisations in Nigeria formed in 2004, operating in the oil-rich Niger Delta region. Economic inequalities in Nigeria are believed to contribute to the rise of the group. Its focus on attacking oil infrastructure, exploiting and oppressing civilians, and causing environmental devastation is because of partnerships between corporations and the Nigerian government. Primarily composed of Ijaw members, MEND disrupted the activities of international oil firms and the Nigerian government, citing economic disparities, environmental degradation, and fraud in the Niger Delta as their reasons. They employed various strategies such as armed assaults, kidnapping, murder, pipeline destruction, and oil theft. MEND utilised swarm-based manoeuvres, speed boats in swamps to attack the government's defences. Their objectives include localising oil control and seeking reparations from the government due to environmental degradation resulting from the oil industry activities in the region. The group's activities, including guerrilla warfare, sabotage, theft, kidnapping, and property destruction, posed a regional threat in the Niger Delta and throughout Nigeria.

2. Niger Delta Avengers (2016-present):

The Niger Delta Avengers emerged in 2016 as a militant group operating in the Niger Delta region. Their activities of bombing pipelines, oil infrastructure, and wells had severe consequences for the region and the nation. Moreover, it negatively impacted the revenue generated by the states in the region. The state's share of the 13 per cent derivation is determined by the amount of oil they produce. The militants' actions, coupled with the decline in global oil prices, resulted in a reduction in oil production and subsequently affected the states' budgets, leading to a shortage of funds for the provision of social

amenities. According to Governor Okowa of Delta State (Onabu & Iroegbu, 2016), the region is suffering financially, environmentally, and economically due to the pipeline bombing by the Niger Delta militants. The group was targeting oil pipelines and other crucial infrastructure, costing the central government N1.3 billion (\$6.72 million) every day and making it difficult to implement the 2016 budget of N6.07 trillion (Eziukwu, 2016). The group's actions have also had an effect on marine security in the Gulf of Guinea, leading to an upsurge in pirate attacks coming from the Niger Delta area. In the Gulf of Guinea, criminal gangs from Nigeria that operate in the Niger Delta are involved in 70% of piracy-related crimes. Nine of the 12 attacks that were reported in the Gulf of Guinea during the first quarter of 2016 originated in Nigeria (Onuoha, 2016). The Niger Delta insurgents' activities also had an impact on Nigeria's ability to produce electricity. Electricity output has decreased as a result of the bombing of gas pipelines that deliver gas to power plants, with capacity falling from roughly 4,800 megawatts in August 2015 to 1,000 megawatts in May 2016. (Onuoha, 2016). The nation's economy's productivity and service delivery have suffered as a result of this downturn.

3. Boko Haram (early 2000s-present):

Boko Haram, also known as Jama'atul Ahlus Sunnah Lidda'wati wal Jihad, began as a small-scale Islamic movement in Maiduguri, Borno State, about 2002, with a concentration primarily on preaching and almsgiving. The Nigerian government's crackdown on the group's adherents, which resulted in Muhammad Yusuf's death as their spiritual and political leader, however, marked a dramatic change in the group's operations in 2009. Around 13,000 people were killed by Boko Haram between 2009 and 2015. The gang has intensified its attacks against law enforcement officers, governmental agencies, educational facilities, mosques, and the general populace. The kidnapping of 250 schoolgirls in Chibok in April 2014 was one prominent occurrence. The group's menace undermines Nigeria's ability to function as a cohesive political entity. The sect leader declared the territory under their control to be a new Islamic Caliphate in August 2014, with stringent Sharia laws in place. (Shuaibu et al, 2015).

4. Indigenous People of Biafra IPOB (2015 - Present):

The 2012-founded IPOB, which replaced MASSOB, has also contributed to the instability of Nigerian politics. Protests, run-ins with the police, and disruptions of public events have resulted from the group's pro-Biafran separatist ideology, especially in the southeast. As a result of several military crackdowns on IPOB activities in the country's

southeast between 2015 and 2017, there were numerous reports of protestors being killed during various protests at Owerri, Aba, Asaba, and Port Harcourt (Johnson and Olaniyan, 2017). After then, the group started fighting against Nigerian security forces. The arrest and arraignment of the Igbo separatist group's leader Maazi Nnamdi Kanu by the federal government on about 15 counts, including terrorism and treasonable crime, increased the commotion the group was causing. For instance, a compulsory Monday sit-at-home policy, a disguised curfew, has been enforced by the non-state group in the Southeastern states of the country since July 2021 and defaulters severely punished. This civil unrest has claimed many lives and properties of innocent easterners and is almost coming to stay in the region since the demands of the group are not yet met.

Table 1.3: Summary of major ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria

N	Agitation or Conflict	Start Date	End Date	Duration (years)
	MEND	2004	2014	10
	Niger Delta Avengers	2016	Present	7
	Boko Haram insurgency	2002	Present	21
	IPOB protests	2015	Present	8

Source: Wikipedia

From table 1.3, it is clear that some agitations spiked at the advent of former President Muhammadu Buhari's tenure in 2015. This points to the fact that agitations for self-independence either by governance or resource control were rekindled in some quarters of the country during this period, buttressing their marginalisation and leading to political instability. In line with this, Terwase (2016) opined that the proliferation of secessionist groups during Buhari's regime is tightly connected with the truncation of the zoning formula earlier adopted by the People's Democratic Party, through which their past administrations ensured a balanced occupation of the executive and legislative arms of government by candidates from the major ethnic groups of Nigeria.

Through an empirical analyses of the agitations of the above-mentioned groups and their implications on peace and political stability, one can easily deduce that each tends to fight for the rights of people from one or more of the six major geopolitical zones of the country, maintaining an ethnic or religious inclination. Also, they have been pivotal in disrupting political stability in Nigeria at various points in the nation's history.

MEND, Niger Delta Avengers, Boko Haram insurgency, and IPOB movements with their concomitant conflicts, fueled by ethno-religious tensions, secessionist aspirations, and political grievances, underscore the point that there have been severe marginalisations of some ethnic minorities in the Nigerian polity, hence the pockets of grievances from such regions. Olaiya et al (2014) support this proposition that ethnic conflicts have negatively impacted the country's democracy in the past.

Conclusion

Against this backdrop, the various challenges to the Implementation of the rotational presidency have been appraised. In contrast to the arguments by various authors concerning the workability of the rotational presidency in addressing marginalisation and political injustice for the peace and progress of Nigeria, this paper asserts that the principle of rotational presidency remains a formidable solution to the problems in question. Criticism that the principle would not address the Nigerian question is too close to call. Above all, this paper affirms that the loopholes that shroud the idea are the reasons why the principle may seem ineffective. If properly addressed in line with the principles of equity, justice and fairness, and enshrined in the constitution with an explicit successive plan and strict enforcement, the issue of marginalisation will be completely addressed and the nation will once again enjoy stability, peace, and a rapid socio-economic and political development. Hence the solution to the Nigerian question transcends above factoring it into the constitution to defining the practical guidelines to be followed.

Recommendation

The study therefore recommends that federal governments should set up an all-encompassing committee to address the issue, that would marshal out in clear detail how rotational presidency should be coded into the constitution, practised and sustained. The committee should comprise stakeholders from all the ethnic groups and religious affiliations of the country, including youth forums and women's social groups. The deliberations and proceedings of such would be representative of popular opinions and would address the problems of marginalisation and political injustice in Nigeria.

Suggestions for Further Studies

The study takes into account the proliferation of agitations and separatist groups in the country. The four selected for the study are only sample size from the whole and the most prominent in terms of disrupting political stability in the country. Also, a cursory look at this work shows apparent

loopholes for exploitation, especially for critical minds on the aspect of the possibility of the implementation of the recommendations therein. However, the nature of research is such that it is never ended; hence from the academic point of view and from research, propositions have been made. It therefore becomes the preoccupation of the policymakers to see to the implementations if objectively, these recommendations can ameliorate Nigerian political squabbles and tension. However for those who genuinely feel that more need to be done especially on the aspect praxis of implementation and not just theory, the research goes on.

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