

CRITIQUE OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE'S TRANSVALUATION OF VALUES

USMAN, Salaudin, PhD

Department of Philosophy
Prince Abubakar Audu University, Anyigba
usmansalaudin@gmail.com

&

Benedict Michael. PhD

Department of Philosophy
Benue State University, Makurdi
mshamijah@bsum.edu.ng, benmike3@gmail.com

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Abstract

The paper seeks to examine Friedrich Nietzsche's notion of Transvaluation philosophy. It looks at the various aspects of his philosophy especially his moral philosophy where he critiqued Christian morality referring to it as slave morality. As a replacement, Nietzsche argued for the existence, shifts or propounded the superman morality. The difference between the two moral systems is the values they present or provide. Employing the philosophical method of analysis, the study seeks to examine the dichotomy between the two values and show how the transvaluation of values brings about human progress.

Keywords: Transvaluation, Super Morality, Nietzsche, Christian Morality, Slave Morality

Introduction

Friedrich Nietzsche was a descendant of theologians who made his reputation in philosophy through a "campaign against morality." Born in the Prussian city of Rocken, Being the only male member of the family after the death of his father, he was given special attention by the other family members consisting of his mother, his younger sister and other female relatives. In keeping with the family tradition of piety, Nietzsche's home life and early education was well tailored towards this background. However, as a young student at the university of Bonn and Leipzig, his thinking underwent a radical transformation. He was much impressed by the vitality of the ancient Greco-Roman civilization and by the grim realism of the contemporary principle of the "survival of the fittest."

These influences, together with the pessimistic, antirationalistic philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, were the chief external source

of Nietzsche's extreme revulsion against the ideals of his time; to him, European civilization appeared despicably weak and decadent (Albert et al 239).

Based on the strength of his exceptional academic ability he was appointed professor of classical philology at the University of Basel in Switzerland at the young age of twenty-four. Not yet done with devastating life, by the time he was thirty-five years old, poor health forced him to resign this honorable appointment. For nearly a decade, Nietzsche engaged in travelling through Europe in a vain search for an environment in which he might recover his ailing health. Despite Nietzsche's health he was noted to have exceedingly produced a succession of brilliant philosophical works, these works changed the philosophical temperament of Western philosophy. These works include: *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music* published in 1872 others are *Thought Out of Season* (1876), *Human-All-Too-Human* (1880), *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886), *The Genealogy of Morals* (1887), and *The Anti-Christ* (1889). *The Dawn of Day* (1881), *The Joyful Wisdom* (1882), and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1884). His final work which was a collection of fragment was *The Will to Power* (1889). The paper however seeks to examine the trans valuation of values in his works.

Nietzsche's Idea of Philosophy

Nietzsche's contribution to philosophy cannot be described within a simple descriptive analysis within, and in the defense against the tendency to evaluate ideas in terms of the man rather than by their own merits. The fact remains that his works pricked the philosophical mind of the time because of its "brilliance of insight, shrewdness of argument, and soundness of scholarship" (Albert et al 240). Conversely his radical philosophical ideas have been welcome by many conscientious thinkers in such areas like literature, art, pedagogy, politics, religion, and ethics, who had seen the decline of individuality and free expression in the "machine age." We shall examine his philosophy under the following subheadings:

Attacks on Traditional Morality

Nietzsche believes that philosophers must serve as "the bad conscience of the age", thus proposes a moral counter movement in order to forestall the

decadence and hypocrisy of traditional European morality. To him, this decadent morality was one which would lead to the eclipse of Western civilization. Therefore, averting the disaster was imperative.

After thousands of years of error and confusion, it is my good fortune to have rediscovered the road which leads to a Yea and to a Nay. I reach people to say Nay in the face of all that makes for weakness and exhaustion. I reach people to say Yea in the face of all that makes for strength, that preserves strength, and justifies the feeling of strength (Nietzsche, *The Will* 54)

Mainly seen as ridiculing the existing acceptable ideals of the Judeo-Christian religion and Greek rationalism, Nietzsche tends to describe them as *reversals* of true values. Thus he presented a perceived correct table of virtues to be implemented for the moral revolution – that is, in place of humility, pride; in place of sympathy and pity, contempt and aloofness; in place of love of one's neighbor, no more that tolerance. Ironically, Nietzsche does not intend this doctrine of *transvaluation of values* for the "common herd", but for the few "free spirits" of the day who are intellectually fit to receive it (Nietzsche *The Will* 428). It is on the basis of the above that M. M. Albert (241) posits:

In a series of pungent aphorisms, replete with invective and wit, Nietzsche addresses himself to the aristocracy of free spirits. He exhorts them to prepare for the highest stage in human development, the Superman. For Nietzsche, the Superman symbolizes the unfettered spirit, reveling in his magnificent strength and his own worth.

Furthermore,

Although humanity in its present condition may be regarded as the highest form of existence, our dominance over nature is still precarious. Indeed, "man is something to be surpassed." The Superman represents a higher level of mastery over nature (241).

On the one hand, if he is weakly constituted, he may fall victim to despair in the face of nihilism, the recognition that life as no intrinsic meaning. On the other hand, for a "strong" or creative individual, nihilism presents a liberating opportunity take responsibility for meaning to exercise creativity by "transvaluing" his values, thereby establishing a new "order" of rank. It is on the basis of this that Nietzsche through his "prophet", Zarathustra, imagine such a person as the "overman" or "superman", the one who teaches "the meaning of the earth" and has no need of other worldly supports for the values he embodies.

Thus, in Nietzsche's view, the overman represents a form of life, a mood of existence that is to blossom from the communalized, moralized "last man" of the nineteenth century. Hopefully he has understood that nihilism become the ultimate meaning of the moral point of view, its life-denying essence, and thus configures the moral idea of autonomy so as to realize the life-affirming potential embedded within it.

Nietzsche's Concept of Evolution

The concept of evolution is fundamental in Nietzsche's ethical system; however, his interpretation of this concept of evolution was a major departure from the wildly acclaimed Darwinian hypothesis. Darwin's theory of evolution was one conceived as passive and mechanical adaptation to the environment; while Nietzsche tends to find the profound meaning of evolution in an aggressive "will to power" to dominate the environment where "The strongest and highest Will to life thus not find expression in a miserable struggle for existence, but in a Will to War, a Will to Overpower" (Nietzsche, in Albert et al 241). Thus Albert opines,

Nietzsche's works are frequently but erroneously regarded as philosophical support for the National Socialist (Nazi) Movement in Germany. While a few themes from his philosophy make support the Nazi doctrines, there are fundamental differences. For example, in the opposition of Nietzsche's principle of radical creative individualism to the Nazi principle of the priority of the state over the individual (241).

It must be noted here that, there is in evolution no progress towards a goal. This is because each thing in the universe manifests a ceaseless, blind striving for power, shifting back and forth between success and failure in the competition for mastery.

Nietzsche's Moral Philosophy

Teaching false moralities hampers our struggle to dominate our environment. In this regard, Nietzsche holds that true morality must build from the immediate sense of power which is felt within us. To Nietzsche, whatever is good conforms to nature, and condemns as bad whatever is contrary to it. However, the point of departure from the numerous moralists' views, is Nietzsche's dismissal as

unrealistic the description of nature as a rational or providential order. He holds that nature is essentially the will to power, a brutal and savage context of strength, which is often characterized by frightfulness and tragedy, bloodshed, suffering, and cruelty. True morality therefore entails affirming the values which enhance the will to power by saying “yea” to life as it is actually is, maintains Nietzsche.

Nietzschean morality professes that all ethical theories which conceal the hard facts of existence and teach the repression of the will to power are insidious. On the basis of the above notion, Nietzsche castigates Christians and Jews, Germans and English men/women, philosophers and scientists and all those who prefer life-denying values. In the process, this assertion thus singles out the Judeo-Christian ethics as the most pernicious source of anti-natural morality. Hence, its perversion of the will to power is seen in clergy men seeking mastery under the cover of hypocritical sermons on meekness, and its repression of the will to power noticed in the “botched and bungled” masses that are taken in by the deceptions of the priests.

Furthermore, taking a swipe on the rationalism of traditional philosophy, it was seen as misrepresenting reality; it is regarded as reinforcing the debilitating influence of Christianity. For Nietzsche, holding up the idea of human being as rational animal, philosophers are believed to have mistakenly elevated reason to the preeminent position in human nature. However, Albert (242) maintains that, “in actuality, the essence of an individual is not reason, but will, that is, will to power.” In the Nietzschean scheme, the role of reason is to facilitate the functioning of the drive for power by organizing efficiently the conditions of action. There is no gain saying the fact that, Nietzsche is notoriously difficult to understand, hence the following reasons can be adduced.

The Two Moralities (Master-Morality and Slave-Morality) of Nietzsche

Notwithstanding the knowledge of philology and history for evidence, Nietzsche contradicts the main currents of the liberal, democratic thought of his time. Thus the cardinal distinction of his ethical theory lies between the “mastery-morality” of the noble and free spirits and the “slave-morality” of the common run of people. It is noticed that in all higher and mixed civilizations, there had been concerted effort at the reconciliation of the two moralities; but, more often there are still confusions and even mutual misunderstanding of them. Hence, the distinction of moral values has either originated in a ruling caste, pleasantly conscious of being different from the subjects/ruled or among the ruled class, the slaves and dependents of all sorts.

In a nutshell, it thus proposes that it is the noble type of man that assumes the determiner of values; he does not require to be approved of, he passes the judgment. This is because, it is believed in this class that “what is injurious to me is injurious to itself”; he knows that it is he himself only who confers honor on things; he is a creator of values. He honors whatever he recognizes in himself; such morality is self-glorification. In the foreground, there is the feeling of plentitude, of power, which seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of a wealth which would fain give and bestow; ---- the noble man who also helps the unfortunate, but not ---- or scarcely ---- out of pity, but rather from an impulse generated by the super abundance of power. Nietzsche in *The Genealogy of Morals* (4 – 10) writes,

The nobler man honors in himself the powerful one, him also who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and how to keep silence, who takes pleasure in subjecting himself to severity and hardness, and has reference for all that is severe and hard.

Juxtaposing the above sentiment with the slave morality whereby the abused, the oppressed, the suffering, the unemancipated, the weary, and those uncertain of themselves, should be the one who realize, what then would be the common element in their moral estimates? Perhaps it sums to a condemnation of man, together with his situation. The fact remains that the slave has an unfavorable eye for the virtues of the powerful, he has a skepticism and distrust, a refinement of distrust of everything “good” that is there honored in such a way that he would fain persuade himself that the very happiness there is not genuine.

On the other hand, one would discover that those qualities which serve to alleviate the existence of sufferers are thus brought fore into prominence. It is here that evokes sympathy, the kind, helping hand, the warm heart, patience, diligence, humility, and friendliness attains to honor; for here these are the most useful qualities and almost the only means of supporting the burden of existence. Slave-morality can therefore be said to be essentially, the morality of unity. This is because therein lies the foundation of the antithesis of “good” and “evil”. Power and dangerousness are assumed to reside in the evil, which is a certain dreadfulness, subtlety, and strength, which do not admit of being despised. The slave-morality arouses fear in the “evil” man while in the master-morality it is the precisely “good” man who arouses fear and therefore seeks to arouse it, while the bad man is regarded as the despicable being (Nietzsche *Beyond Good and Evil* 260).

Different ethical terms for the mastery-morality and slave-morality

There are certain basic distinctions between “good” and “bad” which is made by the aristocrat, while the opposition of “good” and “evil” is the invention of the slaves. On the basis of this view it can be adduced that being motivated by resentment, the slaves call “evil” those characteristics which the aristocrats must honor in themselves. It is therefore apt to ask the question: what is the true etymological significance of the various symbols for the idea “good” which have been coined in various languages? They all led to the same evolution of the same idea that “aristocrat,” “noble” (in the social sense), is the root idea, out of which have necessarily developed “good” in the sense of “with aristocratic soul,” “noble,” in the sense of “with a soul of high caliber,” “with a privilege soul”----- a development which invariably runs parallel with that other evolution by which “vulgar,” “plebeian,” “low,” are made to change finally into “bad.”

From this background the revolt of the slaves in morals begins in the very principle of *resentment* becoming creative and thus giving birth to values. This is a resentment experienced by the creatures who, deprived as they are of the proper outlet of action, are forced to find their compensation in an imaginary revenge. While every aristocratic morality spring from a triumphant affirmation of its own demands, the slave moralities says “no” from the very outset to what is “outside itself,” “different from itself,” and “not itself”; and this “no” is its creative deed (Nietzsche *Beyond Good and Evil* 259).

Furthermore, this “bad” of aristocratic origin and that “evil” out of the cauldron of uncertified hatred--- the former an imitation, an “extra,” and additional nuance; the later, on the other hand, the original, the beginning, the essential act in the conception of a slave-morality--- these two words “bad” and “evil,” shows how great a different do they mark, in spite of the fact that they have an identical contrary in the idea “good”.

But it should be noted that the idea “good” according to Albert, is not the same. This is because much rather the question be asked, “Who is really evil according to the meaning of the morality of resentment?” It can thus be answered: just the good man of other morality, just the aristocrat, the powerful one, the one who rules, but who is distorted by the venomous eye of resentfulness, into a new color, a new signification, and a new appearance. Hence the man who learn to know those “good” ones only as enemy, learn at the same time not to know them only as “*evil enemies*,” and the same men who between equals were kept so rigorously in bounds through convention, respect, custom, and gratitude, though much more through mutual vigilance and jealousy between equals.

Thus, these men who are in their relationship with each other find so many new ways to manifesting consideration, self-control, delicacy, loyalty, pride, and friendship. These men are in reference to what is outside their circle (where the foreign element, a foreign country, begins), not much than that beast of prey, which have been let loose. They enjoy their freedom from all social controls, the feel that in the wilderness they can give vent with impunity to that tension which is produced by enclosure and imprisonment in the peace of society, the revert to the innocent of the beast-of-prey conscience, like jubilant monsters, who perhaps come from ghostly bout of murder, arson, rape, and torture, with bravado, and a moral equanimity, as though merely some wild student's prank had been played, perfectly convinced that the poets have now an ample theme to sing and celebrate.

It is impossible not to recognize at the core of all these aristocratic races the beast of prey; the magnificent blond brute, avidly rampant for spoil and victory; this hidden core needed core an outlet from time to time, the beast must get loose again, must return to the wilderness.

Creativity in Nietzsche's Thought

Nietzsche argues that creativity is the privilege and gift of the aristocratic class, that is, the barbarian, ferocious components of society. Only they, he claims, have accomplished improvements in human nature.

Every elevation of the type "man," has hitherto been the work of an aristocratic society and so it will always be --- a society in a long scale of graduations of rank and difference of worth among human beings, and requiring slavery in some form or other. Without the pathos of distance, such as grow out of the incarnated difference of classes, out of the constant out-looking and down-looking of the ruling caste on subordinates and instruments, and out of their equally constant practice of obeying and commanding, of keeping down and keeping at a distance. This is to say that other more mysterious pathos could never have arisen, the longing for an ever new widening of distance within the soul itself, the formation of ever higher, rarer, further, more extended, more comprehensive states. In short we can say that it is just the elevation of the type "man," the continued "self-summoning of man," that is, if we have to use a moral formula in a super-moral sense.

In other to be sure of all these summations, one must not resign oneself to any humanitarian illusions about the history of the origin of aristocratic society (the preliminary condition for the elevation of the type "man") for the truth is hard.

But let us unprejudicially acknowledge how every higher civilization in the past had originated. For men with a still natural nature, barbarian in every terrible sense of the word, men of prey still in possession of unbroken strength of will and desire for power, threw themselves upon weaker, more moral, more peaceful races such as the trading or cattle rearing communities, or upon old mellow civilizations in which the final vital force was flickering out in brilliant firework of wit and depravity.

At the commencement, the noble caste was always the barbarian caste. Their superiority did not consist first of all their physical manifestation, but in their psychical power in which they were more *complete* men which at every point also implies as “more complete beasts” (Nietzsche *Beyond Good and Evil* 257).

According to Nietzsche, the psychical impotence of the “herd” is reflected in the morality that it produces. The basic principle of all slave-morality, in Nietzsche’s view, is resentment of the autocratic spirit. He gave an example that, altruism, which he termed as typical slave ideal, denies the value of creative egoism which is central to the mastery-morality.

The preponderance of an altruistic way of valuing is the result of a consciousness of the fact that one is botched and bungled. From a psychological valuation point of view this is just to say that “I am not worth much,” it is therefore a feeling of impotence, of lack of great self-asserting impulse of power. When we translate this valuation in the various cultures of the classes into a moral or religious principle (the preeminence of religious or moral precepts is always a sign of low culture), which tends to justify itself in spheres of the notion of “value” hails. For a clearer interpretation one is bound to adduce this to the Christian sinner who tries to understand himself by justifying his lack of power and self-confidence. In the process, he prefers to feel himself as a sinner rather than feel bad for nothing. This situation in which man founds himself is a symptom of decay when interpretations of this sort are used at all.

However, in some cases, the botched and bungled do not look for reason of their guilt unfortunate precarious situation as a result of their guilt (as the Christian does) (Nietzsche *Beyond Good and Evil* 260). But in the society, controlled by the socialists, the anarchist, and the Nihilist are conscious that their existence is something for which someone must be guilty, who also believes that he can more easily endure his ill ease and his wretched constitution when he has found someone whom he can hold responsible for it. Here, it can clearly be seen in this scenario, the instinct of revenge and resentment as a means of enduring life. The altruistic theory and practice is more of self-preservation measure.

The hatred of egoism either one's own (the case of the Christian) or another (the case of socialist) thus appears as a valuation reached under the predominance of revenges and also as an act of prudence on the part of preservation instinct of the suffering. This manifests in the form of an increase in their feelings of cooperation and unity (Nietzsche *Beyond Good and Evil* 260).

The cult of altruism can be said to be merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly appears under certain definite physiological circumstances. The fervent cry of the socialist with righteous indignation for "justice," "rights," "equal rights," only entails his oppressed situation under his inadequate culture and unable to understand the rationale behind his lamentation. In fact, man in this situation derives pleasure in crying instead of seeking his pleasure elsewhere. For a Christian, curses, condemns and slanders the "world" without exempting himself. Nietzsche believes that one need not take both scenarios (socialist and Christian) seriously because we are in the presence of invalids who feels better for crying as well as relief in slandering.

The Ideals of Peace and Universal Equality in Nietzsche's Thought

Continuing from the previous condemnations, Nietzsche proceeded to condemn the ideals of peace and universal equality by exposing life-denying qualities of exploitation and competition. Exploitation and competition, according to Nietzsche, characterize all living things, because they are the very essence of the Will to Power. In this regard, in order to refrain mutually from violence, from injury, from exploitation and put one's will on the same pedestal with others, which may result in good conduct among individuals with attendant requisites such as the actual similarities of the individual in amount of force and degree of worth, and their co-relation within one organization.

Generalization of this theory of the fundamental principle of society would disclose the Will to the denial of life, a principle dissolution and decay. It is incumbent to resist all sentimental weaknesses; for life is essentially appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation. And at least putting these words mildly, exploitation. These are disparaging words that had been used in ages causing discomfort to individuals and society. This is incarnated Will to Power, which endeavor to grow, to gain ground, attract to itself and acquire ascendancy not owing to any morality or immorality, because it lives and life is Will to Power.

The consciousness of the Europeans in Nietzsche's view must be critically corrected. Exploitation does not belong to the depraved, or imperfect and primitive society. It is fundamentally a consequence of the intrinsic Will to power or Will to Life, which is fundamental fact of history. We should be honest towards ourselves (Nietzsche *Beyond Good and Evil* 259).

The Primary Responsibility for Dishonest Morality

Nietzsche contends that the primary responsibility for the dishonest morality exhausting European civilization is Judaism and Christianity. Sounding profoundly anti-religious, Nietzsche poured his venomous vituperations thus;

I regard Christianity as the most fatal and seductive lie that has ever yet existed--- as the greatest and *most impious lie*; I can discern the last sprouts and branches of its ideal beneath every form of disguise, I decline to enter into any compromise or false position in reference it--- I urge people to declare open war with it (Nietzsche *Beyond Good and Evil* 230)

An open war is cleared against Christianity and its principles by Nietzsche for he believes that, the morality of the paltry people as the measure of all things, which is the most repugnant kind of degeneracy that civilization has ever gets brought into existence. The people profess this kind of ideal under the banner of "God" over man's head.

Nietzsche further holds that however modest one's demands may be concerning intellectual cleanliness, when one torches a sort of inexpressive feeling of discomfort; for the unbounded check with which lies the greater problem of existence. And thus claim to sit in judgment on all matter. The impudent impunity with which human problems are discussed and treated gives Nietzsche nightmares, feeling that life, the world, God and the purpose of life are issues that demand rigorous think and not just treated as simple by religious bigots. This view held by Nietzsche is grossly scandalous and one cope that Nietzsche's senility had taken serious hold of him at this point.

If the law, which is the fundamentally realistic formula of certain self-preservative measures of a community, forbids certain actions of men that have definite tendency to jeopardize the existing harmonious welfare of the community, it does not however, forbid the attitude of mind which gives rise to their actions. In this realm, Nietzsche derides the moral idealist's assertion which holds that; "God sees into men's hearts, the action of itself counts for nothing; the reprehensive attitude of mind from which it proceeds must be extirpated..."

(Nietzsche *beyond Good and Evil* 230). It is a known fact that in moral conditions, men laugh at such things; while in exceptional cases, the community not only wages wars against such attitudes in order to preserve itself, but at the same time, consciousness is attached to such attitude. Thus any attitude of mind that negates the social norm is abandoned because its utility cannot be conceived.

Nietzsche furthermore extended his swipe on Buddhism. He gave an example to the effect that Buddha appeared among the people who were both peaceable and afflicted with great intellectual weariness. This was also the case in regard to the first Christian community (as also the Jewish), the primary condition which was the absolutely unpolitical Jewish society. This attitude goes further to emasculate the people into a parasitic existence where nature is expelled from morality when it is said, “love ye your enemies,” “ye shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy,” as now become senseless in law (in instinct). Nietzsche’s main concern here is that God is introduced everywhere while utility is withdrawn in such a way that the natural origin of morality is denied everywhere. There abounds the veneration of nature, which lies in the acknowledging a natural morality that is destroyed to the root.

Nietzsche maintains that,

What is it I protest against? That people should regard this paltry and peaceful mediocrity, this spiritual equilibrium which knows nothing of defined impulses of great accumulation of strength, as something high, or possibly as the standard of all things (*The Will to Power* 200 - 201).

Nietzsche thus sums up his avowed hatred for Judaism and Christianity by stressing their unsuitability for the evolutionary struggle. For he believes that among men, as among all other animals there is a surplus of defective, diseased, degenerating, infirm, and necessarily suffering individuals; the successful cases, among men also, are always the exception; and in view of the fact that *man is the animal not yet properly adapted to his environment*, the rare exception. But worse still. The higher the type a man represent, the greater is the improbability that he will succeed; the accidental, the law of irrationality in the general constitution of mankind, manifests itself most terribly in its destructive effect on the higher order of men. The conditions of those whose lives are delicate and diverse are difficult to determine.

At this point, we are apt to ask the question that: what then, is the attitude of the two greatest religions (in those days) above-mention to the surplus of failures in life? The answer to this question stems from the fact that the Endeavour to preserve and keep alive whatever can be preserve as the case may be in religions

for *sufferers*. They take the path based on principle in which they are always in favor of those who suffer from life as from a disease, however, they find threat of every other experience of life seen as false and impossible.

However highly we may esteem this above indulgent and preservative care (inasmuch as in applying to others, it has applied, and applies also to the highest and usually to the most suffering type of man) the hitherto paramount religions... are among the principal causes which have kept the type of "man" upon a lower level – they have preserved too much *that which should have perished* (Nietzsche *Will to Power* 201).

Sarcastically, Nietzsche believes that paramount religions mentioned earlier have indeed performed well as elucidated thus:

One as to thank them for invaluable services; and who his sufficiently rich in gratitude not to feel poor at the contemplation of all that the "spiritual men" of Christianity have done for Europe hitherto! But when they are giving comfort to the sufferers, courage to the oppressed and despairing, a staff and support to the helpless, and when they had allured from society to convents and spiritual penitentiaries the broken hearted and distracted: ... with a good conscience for the preservation of all the sick suffering... to work for deterioration of European race? (Nietzsche *Beyond Good and Evil* 62).

Transvaluation of Values for Human Progress

We may ask the question that: what is transvalue values? Transvalue values implies that all spontaneous motives, all new, future, and stronger motives are still extant; but that they now appear under false names and false valuations, and have not yet become conscious of themselves. The reason for transvaluation of values is that that further progress of humanity requires it to give the Will to Power its rightful place. It is thus important to say that, we ought to have courage to be conscious, and to affirm all that which has been attained in order to get rid of the humdrum character of old valuations, which makes us unworthy of the best and strongest things that we have achieved.

According to Nietzsche, any doctrine would be superfluous for which everything is not already prepared in the will of accumulated forces and explosive materials. Thus a transvaluation of values can only be accomplished when there is a tension of new needs, and a new set of needy people who feel all old values as painful; however, they are not conscious of what is wrong.

Hence,

The standpoint from which my values are determined; is abundance or desire active?... Is one a mere spectator or is one's own shoulder at the will... Is one looking away or one turning aside?... Is one acting spontaneously, or is one merely reacting to a goad or to a stimulus?... Is one simply acting as a result of a paucity of elements, or of such an overwhelming dominion over a host of elements that this power enlists the latter into its service if it requires them? (Nietzsche *Will to Power* 1007 - 1009)

Furthermore,

Is one a problem one's self or is one a solution already?... Is one perfect through the smallness of the task, or imperfect owing to the extraordinary character of the aim?... Is one genuine or only an actor, or is one genuine as an actor or only the bad copy of an actor?... Is one a representative or the creature represented?... Is one a personality or merely a rendezvous of personalities?... Is one ill from a disease or from surplus wealth?... Does one lead as a shepherd, or as an "exception (third alternative: as a fugitive)?"... Is one proud enough not to feel ashamed even of one's vanity?... Is one still capable of a "duty?" (there are some people who lose the whole joy of their lives if they are deprived of their duty --- this holds good especially of the feminine creatures, who are born subjects) (Nietzsche *Will to Power* 1007 - 1009)

Thus the strong man considers all the above in quest for power in order to have not only all the morbid traits of the century but to be able to balance them by means of overflowing, plastic, and rejuvenating power.

The new philosophy of strength can be effective only when the necessary tasks are performed. Truth according to Nietzsche must be shown to those who are fit to receive it. This is the tasks which Nietzsche believes that he and others must devote themselves. However, our heart swell with pride when the beautiful, glistening, jingling, and festive verbiage words are made to come to play in our daily affairs. Such soothing verbiage as honesty, love of truth, love of wisdom, sacrifice for knowledge, heroism of the truth gladdens our heart but they belong to the old false adornment of unconscious human vanity. Man must be wary of these verbiages. "For thou art more! Thou art higher! Thou hast a different origin!" this may be a strange and foolish task, but that it is a task, who can deny ((Nietzsche *Beyond Good and Evil* 230).

Conclusion

Whether Nietzsche is an existentialist or not is a question about which men may differ, but in any event he has exerted strong influence on the philosophical movement. Nietzsche's intellectual prowess propelled him profoundly into the academia without formal qualifications. He was able to etch his name among the most influential philosophers in Western philosophy. He is unchallenged as the most insightful, powerful and charismatic critic of moral climate of the nineteenth century. His exploitation of the unconscious motivations can be said to have profoundly anticipated Sigmund Freud's thought. Notoriously, he stressed the "Will to Power" --- that is, the basis of human nature, the resentment that comes when it is denied its basis in action, and the corruptions of human nature thus encouraged by religions (Christianity, that feeds on such resentment).

However, the powerful human being who escapes all this, *Übermensch* (the "overman") is not the "blood beast" of later fascism. Rather it is a human being who has mastered passion. He has risen above the senseless flux and given creative style to his or her character. Thus Nietzsche's free spirits recognize themselves by their joyful ambiance to eternal return. The disquieting fact remains that Nietzsche vehemently condemns any uncaged beast of prey who best finds their style by exerting repulsive power over others.

There is no gain saying that Nietzsche's work is hard to understand as he frequently expressed misogyny, leaving the interpretation of his many - layered and ironic writings in an unstraightforward manner. He tactically balanced the anti-Semitism found in his work with an equally repudiation of anti-Semitism and greater dislike of the German character of his time.

The current influence that Nietzsche derives does not only come from his celebration of the *Will* but most profoundly from his skepticism about the notions of truth and fact. He anticipated many of the central tenets of "post-modernism" --- this is an aesthetic attitude towards the world that sees it as a "text"; the denial of fact; the denial of essences, the celebration of the plurality of interpretations and of the fragmented self; as well as the downgrading of reason and the politicization of discourse.

Nietzsche expectantly awaited the rediscovery in the twentieth century which also has the incapable advantage over his contemporaries and followers of being a wonderful stylist. More so, his perspectivism is echoed in the shifting array of literary devices such as humor, irony, exaggeration, aphorism, verse, dialogue, and parody with which he employed in his exploration of hum an life and history.

The overriding concern of Nietzsche is to find a way to take the measure of human in the modern world in which he sees complicity between morality and the Christian God that perpetuates a life-denying and so ultimately nihilistic stance. The intension here is to provide a purely human account of moral normativity. While some earlier philosophical theories tend to offer justification of the normative force of moral normativity, Nietzsche believes that behind moral prescriptions lay nothing but “Will to Power” thereby undermining that authority.

Thus the resentment of the weak against the powers of the strong is an expression that arose from the Judeo-Christian moral order; a tool used to thwart that power, became internalized in the form of conscience, thereby creating a “sick” animal whose will is at war with its own vital instincts. Hence the idea that the “crowd is untruth”; the so-called autonomous, self-legislating individual is nothing but a herd animal that has trained itself to docility and unfreedom by conforming to the “universal” standard of morality. The individual nevertheless has the potential to become something else. This is because the sick animal is “pregnant with the future”; notwithstanding, though, the fact that the “highest values” had begun to “devalue themselves”.

As an imperative, human existence as to create meaning and value in the world from which all transcendent supports have falling away in order to give unique shape to our immediate inclinations, drives, and passions; to interpret, prune, and enhance according to a unifying sensibility, a ruling instinct, that brings everything into a whole that satisfies the non-conceptual, aesthetic norm of what fits, what belongs, and what is appropriate.

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