

**EZIOKWU: ITS DENIZENS FOR TRUTH-CONDITIONS  
IN IGBO LANGUAGE**

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**Abstract**

*The question about the conception of truth, the problem of truth, the being of truth, the condition of truth etc. has remained a perennial occupation about the 'sense and meaning' of philosophy as such. The review, reflection, research, criterion etc. for the establishment of the implicit datum for the understanding, realization and use of 'truth' has always remained within the dominion of the language-world (Sprache-Welt) of any given philosophy. It is also the existential duty, mark, sign, feature and character-trait-property of philosophy to ask questions about the nature and world of 'truth' from within the structural-ties and priorities of a language 'use'. It is therefore easy to appreciate Hegel from his German approach to the problem of truth when he states that: The true (truth) is all (Das Wahre ist das Ganze). Based on the above positions, this short paper is an attempt to queue into the 'truth-condition theory-regimentations' of the philosophy-worlds and as such, the author's search-machinery Eziokwu ('Truth') for this same attempt, stands existentially manufactured from the language fabrics of the author, a denizen of Igbo language world and hood.*

**Keywords:** Eziokwu, Denizens, Truth-Condition, Igbo, Language

**Truth- Condition: The Little Worry**

It is a mundane fact within the duties of the philosophies of language, sociolinguistics and linguistics, that every word-use in any given language, in the human language-world-hood, must have 'meaning' for the speaker/speakers of the same language of/in 'use', especially the language which this short paper stands to call an 'own-ness-language' and that is to say, a language that is local and indigenous – a language of denizens.

This short paper has chosen to adopt the concept of 'denizenation' to indicate and signify the rights of citizenships, rights of local inhabitants, the rights of birth or even the rights of admittances and privileges of citizenship for a total sociolinguistic domestication through the media of a 'language use in competence and performance'. In the case of this paper therefore, the

identification note is with reference to the local language of the author of this paper which is the 'Igbo Language'.

The word *Eziokwu* that is the only word that identifies and comparatively compounds with the English word 'Truth' (as an equivalent), has within this single word itself comprehensively the compound elemental denizens of Igbo 'Truth-Conditions'. It is majorly, the task of this short paper, to assert the inherent proofs for an Igbo 'Truth-Condition' based on the meaning of this single Igbo word '*Eziokwu*' only, unlike other truth conditions in many languages whereby their conditions are made possible through the analytics of sentences. This paper is conscious of the facts that many philosophers of language have developed alternative approaches to contain the problems that concern 'Truth-Conditions' within the relational theories of inquires, interpretations, inferences, knowledge-competences etc. from speech and definitions of meaning, language-world-clues and intentional sentential semantics.

In line with the general approaches to the questions about 'Truth-Conditions' in philosophy, this short paper has basically returned to the fundamental question of relational referencing of the meanings of 'sense', as to ask the question about how a speaker of any given language arrives at the correctness that confirms what has been said and how what has been said depends on the facts that qualify what has been said to mean 'truth'. This is to say in brief that: Meaning is 'Truth-Condition'.<sup>1</sup>

### **Denizenation: As Language World and Meaning**

The implication of the expression that meaning is 'Truth-Condition' stands to apply the facts that the words that make up a sentence are services of information for the user of the language that is in question. On the other hand, the information the individual words that make up the sentence are implicitly indicative of the given 'world-hood' of the speaker that uses them.

It is only on this platform of word-concatenation and/or compositionality that the speaker (denizen) of the "own-ness" or bedizened language can condition meaning as 'sense' for the socially constituted language/linguistic commerce that gives approval for 'the true or false conditioning' of what has been said through the language use. This very fact is what Wittgenstein calls the 'conceptual trinity of 'language-world-and-life'<sup>2</sup> and this can be called denizenation.

To understand Wittgenstein in more details, we have to make a reference to the implicit expression that the 'world of a language is behind mere words'.<sup>3</sup> This is

also to say that the self-evidence (truth-condition) of the world is expressed in the very fact that language means only it, and can only mean it.<sup>4</sup> And an expression has meaning only in the stream of life where this life is a life-world, world of life or the stream of life<sup>5</sup>.

The world in question is in accordance with Kripke's fundamental criticism of the description theory of proper names that underscores his concept of the 'possible world'. The possible world in this case defines and fixes the sentence's (word's) meaning and this in accordance with the possible world that is the case in point and therefore a 'given sentence or proposition varies its 'truth-value (condition)' from world to world'.<sup>6</sup> Lycan further states that 'Individual senses'...are functions from worlds to individual denizens of those worlds'.<sup>7</sup> In this case a truth-condition can be called a designator and a composite of its world and the denizens.

In line with the above, it is very clear that any given language in 'use' is a definitive clue to the world of the user. Therefore every human language that is in 'use' is a composite result of the inbuilt contingencies of the 'life-world, world-hood and life-form etc. of the user. The above also implies that any language that is in 'use' is directly an expression of the world lived-out in denizenation. Based on the above 'founder-mental' and fundamental claims, a speaker of any human natural language can assert in a depth social affirmation that: I am English, I am Igbo etc. This is the reason why when a given language is looked at from the surface and depth grammatical senses, we can confirm like Wittgenstein did that 'the limit of my language is the limit of my world'.<sup>8</sup> The world in this case is therefore made manifest through the language we use. Wittgenstein in numerous occasions returned to state that all about human life is 'life behind mere words'. And in the words of Wittgenstein we note the dictum 'Never look for meaning in isolation, but only in the context of a life and life is world'<sup>9</sup>

Time and again Wittgenstein treats the concepts of life, world and the meaning of a word as having a home in the personal life of the 'own-ness language, and as such, as being embedded in life, as patterns in the weave of life, claiming therefore that words have meaning (sense-truth-condition) only in the flux of life, the bustle of life or the stream of life'.<sup>10</sup> Life, world and meaning are therefore closely made in and through the language in 'use'.

In the words of Kishik , we learn that:

Meaning, however, is neither the fuel of the engine nor the destination of the vehicle, but it is the very movement, work, or activity, while the engine is in gear. In this way, meaning is taken...to be inseparable from the use of language.<sup>11</sup>

Meaning stands as the method of giving sense and essence to the hidden social community. Meaning can also be called the communal basements of knowledge-commerce and the consciousness of the interfluves of the 'own-ness' language, world and life.

In this case, any language/linguistic/philosophical advances towards any truth-condition-theory, cannot be handled in isolation but through and only through a tandem-search-mechanism, linkage and contexture of the concrete life-world of the given language and the owner-user of that language of inquiry. The above statement gives credence and meaning to the concept of 'language and denizenation' and in the case of this short paper, it is Igbo language in spite of the author's use of English for an inquiry into the Igbo concept *Eziokwu* as truth condition and this, in spite of the Harare (1997) Declaration ( Intergovernmental Conference of Ministers on Language Policy in Africa) which states that 'the optimal use of African language is a prerequisite for maximizing African creativity and resourcefulness in development'.

### ***Eziokwu* as Truth-Condition: Its Denizens**

The word '*Eziokwu*' in Igbo language world is directly the equivalent of the word 'Truth' in English. This paper has already submitted above that it is written in English for English readers as against the application of the cited 'Harare Declaration'. This paper is also very conscious of the submission of Prah that was ahead of the 'Harare Declaration' which says that:

The underdevelopment of Africa is not only an economic reality. At the cultural level its manifestation is demonstrated by the marginalization of African languages. From 'anthropological-philosophical' approach, it is impossible to separate language (mother tongue-own-ness language-the language of denizens) from culture and culture from language. It would appear that an agenda to Africanize education would begin here.<sup>12</sup>

In spite of the above submissions, this paper remains a conscious presentation for a possible revelation that Igbo language has '*a-one-word-solution*' to the old-

aged language and linguistic troubles and squabbles on and about the search for 'truth and its conditioning'.

The histories of philosophy of language and linguistic have so far submitted so many theories, criteria, relevancies etc. for the definitions of truth itself and the conditions that should stand as proofs for it by analyzing sentences and not from one word language enquiry. Okonkwo<sup>13</sup> in 2012 made reference to the above problem in his Inaugural Lecture titled "*Okwu Danahu Onu: The Basic Principle of Igbo Philosophy of Language.*" Therefore this short paper is a 'call-up' of that unfinished referencing. Along the line of the above mentioned referencing, this paper recalls that Thomas Aquinas came up with the position that for truth to be conditioned as truth, it must stand out as *adaequatio intellectus et rei* which later influenced Russell, Popper, Wittgenstein, Tarski etc to come up with the 'Correspondence Theory of Truth'.

Through this approach, 'Truth' is conditioned when reasoning, knowledge, spirit, mind etc stand proof of adequacy while expressing or speech-acting-out (i.e. speaking or environ-metalizing) the 'thing' of an 'own-ness world-hood' and also through objectivities and/or reality-correspondences of circumstantial facts of the states of human affairs of denizens' sententiousness. It is also relevant to mention in passing, other popular theories of truth like the 'Coherence theory' approaches of e.g. Hegel, Schlick, Neurath, Carnap, Hempel; the 'Redundancy theory' of e.g. Ramssey; the 'Performative theory' of e.g. Strawson; the 'Evidence theory' e.g. Brentano, Husserl; the Expository theory of e.g. Heidegger (*aletheia-das Unverborgene*); the 'Pragmatic theory' e.g. Peirce, William James, John Dewey; the 'Consensus theory' e.g. Habermas, Apel etc.

From the above references, it is very evident that there are so many theories of 'truth conditions' and possibly many more to come on the academic platform. All in all so far, the above samples reveal that the theories of 'truth conditions' base their search-machines on the platforms of sententiousness made possible through the gregarious arrangements and strict adherences to the rules and bedizened grammatical word-formations and semanticists-life-worlds. This paper takes a different stance from the above samplings and that is to say, from the English that is also, no doubt, the colonial-bedizened-language 'use' of the author of this short paper.

To this effect, this paper presents a different search-machinery-language-and -linguistic-landscape from the Igbo language itself. This search-machinery language and linguistic landscaping, stands out as a methodology which is made

out of the already highlighted single Igbo word 'Eziokwu' and some in-heritable, complementally-elemental-denizens'-word-intergraded expressions that at the same time form the Igbo conventional, understanding, conditioning, binding, constituting and arranging socially constituted knowledge-flow, meaning and construction of truth as the conditions thereof.

This short paper is also conscious of the fact that philosophy searches for truth as it's situated 'use and function for the love of wisdom' and therefore conditions itself by providing for its endeavors determinate and systemic rules for the regulations of truth and falsehood. The above statement of fact falls in line with the understandings of the human language games and settings which Hymes contains as the 'ethnographies of speaking'<sup>14</sup>. This issue is also a referencing of the strategic and syntactic knowledge exploration that can also be legitimately explored within the stances of what Grice calls conventional 'implicatures' of truth conditions.<sup>15</sup>

From the above, this paper draws some cooperative principles for the main entourage of the Igbo truth conditional ties based on four major Igbo language and linguistic maxims as to work out the roots of truth conditions from the already referenced one word 'Eziokwu' and its elemental-denizens. The major cooperative maxim is 'Okwu' (the spoken word) that can play the cants of different Igbo language/linguistic systemic and regulatory speech conditions for the knowledge, signification and meaning of propositions (*Okwu-Ekwuruekwu – the spoken word*). This '*Okwu-Ekwuruekwu*' with the Igbo conventional 'implicatures' design and designate i.e. precondition the speech (word) quantity, speech (word) quality, speech (word) irrelevance or dialectics, and speech (word) manner for the manifestation of 'truth' that has to be conditioned so as to stand the test of 'truth- *Eziokwu*'.<sup>15</sup>

To explain the implicatures further, the following are few Igbo samples of the four-word- preconditioning-maxims that aid the moderation (word-moderator(s)) of *Eziokwu* 'truth' for the stances of Igbo 'truth-conditions'.

They are:

- (a) **Speech quality:** (*Okwu oma* (the good word); *Okwu Ojoo* (the bad word as word misplacement or misuse), *Okwu manya* and *Okwu Onyera* (word productions out of drunkenness or confused mental derailments) etc.
- (b) **Speech quantity:** (*Okwu* as *Ekwurekwu* (verbigeration-wordiness-chatter-babblement) also known in Igbo as *Ochotompo* and/or *Nkwugheri*);

(c) **Speech irrelevance or dialectics:** (*Ihu Okwu*-(Word-face), *Isi Okwu* (word-head) and *Azu Okwu* (word-back) misuse-defacement of the word or word-bilateralism);

(d) **Speech manner:** (*onu mmiri Okwu*, *Mpu*, *Inyo* (word-salivation)).

The above samples identify some Igbo *expressis verbis* i.e. unwanted word expressiveness that must be expurgated during an Igbo search for the truth condition. On this note, Igbo language must not necessarily follow the English methods that go along with sentence formations in order to showcase a truth condition. The major contention of this short paper is that the Igbo word *Eziokwu-expressis verbis* inherently (is in itself) as 'a word', an *Instrumentum Laboris* as well as a theorem for the comprehension of Igbo truth conditions. This is to say that *Eziokwu* as an Igbo word has no urgency for compositionality in order to stand 'proof' for any theory of truth conditionality. Based on the above premise, the following are the elemental-denizens'-moderators for the truth conditions in Igbo language.

1. *E-(ZI)-OKWU* as a conventional-elemental-denizens'-implicature, explores the legitimate speech ethnographies in keeping, regulating and setting aright the theoretical and practical methods of 'truth and its condition' as: 1. The Way; 2. The Road; 3. The Method; 4. The Rule (Rule-Following) etc. for Truth knowledge.

From the above regulation of *Eziokwu* as the way, the road, the method or the art of word-speech (*expressis verbis*), the word itself becomes the process of letting oneself on the 'way, the high-way- *methodos*' into a knowledge-dialogue with the hermeneutical, inductive, deductive, phenomenological adumbration of the word of speech (the spoken work) as *Eziokwu*, and does so while processing and producing the spoken Igbo word as truth or false. This is simply the reason why the Igbo speaker will at the end of a long or short 'speech-talk' ask the speech presenter- *Eziokwu*?

The frame of such a question summarizes what the German language would present as *Das Verfahren der erklärenden Wissenschaft* (the process of the exposition or clearance of knowledge for the phenomenological conditioning of the true-knowledge). In applying the ideas of Wittgenstein here, the *Eziokwu-question* conveys the means of/for an intricate rule for a condition of truth and therefore remains an inherent rule for the unraveling, untangling, elucidation

and clarification of the form of the Igbo-rule-governed-nature of permeability truth condition of which if this inherent rule is changed, the form, the grasp and meaning of a truth-life and truth-essence will change.

To this effect, Wittgenstein suggests on a general note, that it is only a language-life that has a form, a life that follows certain denizens'-rules, that can function as the ground of the language and consists in the steady ways of living (*Lebensformen*), and regular ways of acting, and that, as such, can necessarily fashion the comprehension of the lives of interlocutors (denizens), just because the rules of the very language in 'use' is an 'imbedded-ness' in the very lives of the denizens.<sup>16</sup>

Therefore, it is only a life that has a form, a life that follows certain rules of a language and functions as the ground of the language that can guarantee a truth condition. The Igbo question *Eziokwu?*, consists in all the above and as a single-word, conditions itself from its *expressis verbis*, as the revelation and manifestation of the 'what-*quidditas*' and the 'thing-*realitas*' and stands out in Igbo language as the way, road, method and rule-following structured condition of 'doing' as well as constituting and conditioning the truth as that social bonding and in so doing, it becomes the gateway to knowledge<sup>17</sup> and consequently stands away from subjective appellations and individuations like solipsism, soliloquy and speaking in tongue-charismatic. *Eziokwu* in this same case becomes the exhibition of constituted Igbo truth-conditional behavior.

2. *E-(ZI)-OKWU* as a conventional-elemental-denizens'-implicature, explores the legitimate speech ethnographies in keeping, regulating and setting aright the theoretical and practical methods of 'truth and its condition' as :
  1. The Real; 2. The Good; 3. The Valuable; The Worthy etc. for Truth knowledge.

The second truth elemental-denizen from the single Igbo word *Eziokwu*, for the moderation of the truth elemental (word)conditioners (*expressis verbis*) follows and flows from the signification of the same word-root-structure '*Eziokwu*' and reflects the constitutive contents and the constructive descriptions of the beingness of truth as, the real, the good, the valuable, the worthy etc and also stands as the question about the same beingness of truth that inherently must spring out of the same question about the beingness of truth-thing-ness. This assertion and application corresponds with the position of Martin Heidegger that: '*die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit entspringt aus der Frage nach der Wahrheit des Wesens*'



(the question after the being of truth consists of the question after the truth of the (that) being).

On this very note therefore, the truth-thing-ness and its being-ness must correspond, adhere and stick to/on the *realitas* and stand as *realitas* about the real, the good, the valuable, the worthiness of the exhibited and constituted knowledge behavior of the very 'known' as the 'unchangeable' in so far as its definitiveness is objectified within the Igbo ideal world (*realitas objectiva*) and the stances of the spoken Igbo word-*Eziokwu*. The method for the conditioning of truth is and becomes therefore the virtue of knowledge itself that can relate with the Greek philosophical conceptions of *eudaimonia*, *arete* and *autarky* (i.e. fulfillment), as the presentation of the authentic, valuable and worthiness of the human *actus intellectus* as against the evils of fallacies, deceitfulness, lies etc.<sup>18</sup>

3. *E-(ZI)-OKWU* as a conventional and elemental-denizens'-implicature explores the legitimate speech ethnographies in keeping, regulating and setting aright the theoretical and practical methods of 'truth and its condition' as: 1. To show; 2. To teach; 3. To demonstrate; 4. To elucidate etc. for 'Truth knowledge'.

In this third submission, *Eziokwu* bring forth the Igbo socially constituted performable operational elemental implicature that highlights the demonstrate-able and elucidate-able synonyms of correspond-able sets of socially constituted concrete operational Igbo language and linguistic arts for conveying truth in and through equip-mental utilizable Igbo conventional dealings designated and derivable from *E-zi-Okwu* with the *Zi* element-denizen disclosing, showing and manifesting 'the truth' as reality.

A good example is where the 'Zi-elemental-denizen-implicature' officiates significantly as the master- apprentice, teacher-student disclosure of facts, reality etc. and allows the manifestation, the reality-showcase, the disclosure, the demonstration, the elucidation of the involved language operations for the truth to appear and open the fact that is the case. *Zi* is therefore the primordial elemental-denizen that reveals the spoken word for the essential 'sense' of thought, meaning and facts made conveyable from the speaker (teacher) to the hearer (student) designations that inhere in '*Okwu ekwuruekwu*- the spoken word'.

From the above three truth conditioning elemental-denizens'-implicatures, the commanding circumspection, signification, instrumental onto-linguistics of *Eziokwu*, based on the inherence of *Zi*-elemental-denizens' constituencies, indicate that an Igbo truth condition can be exposed to know-ability outside the sentential formations unlike the English theories of truth conditionality. The *Zi* of *Eziokwu* contains in itself an all inherently authentic onto-linguistic and philosophical manners of 'truth-conditionality-stuff-for-use' for the intelligibilities of truth as such just because of its textual and contextual technical registers that guarantee its relational, operational and pragmatic characters. *Zi* in *E-z-i-okwu* is the determinant elemental-denizen and factual methodology for the Igbo 'onto-linguistic-making-clear' of and for the idea and ideology of truth so as to become an Igbo socially constituted practical behavior, conduct and conduit serviceable equip-mental conduciveness for a total comprehension of and for the determination of Igbo truth conditions. *Zi* is a 'doing' just like the way J.L.Austin presents his language case to mean: '*How to do thing with words*'.<sup>19</sup>

### **Igbo Definition of 'Truth': Conclusion**

The above sub-heading may at this point surprise some readers of this paper. The surprise may arise from the fact that it would have been necessary at the beginning of the paper to define 'truth' from the Igbo philosophy of language. The question here is: What is the definition of truth in the Igbo context. The reason is simply because, the above expositions of the paper so far, have made their systematic compositions to dovetail into this section from the very fact and reason that this paper finds it worthwhile as well as necessary to get to a definitive point of assessment of the issues of the paper before presenting an adequate theoretical stance and content for an Igbo 'truth-condition-state-of -affairs' that will at the same time also guarantee an Igbo philosophical naming, criterion and relevance among the penumbras of English truth condition theories and thereby advance an Igbo stance of the concept of truth that has a more fundamental dimension to the other theories of truth conditions - from a one-word-theoretical-riot-squad.

From the above presentations, it is clear that Igbo truth-conditioning-descriptive-analysis takes a phenomenological stance from the elemental-denizens' essences of the single word *Eziokwu* as the intuitive knowledge ground. This descriptive analysis of the Igbo word *Eziokwu* is a curious word that exposes, pursues and presents the 'thing-ness' of the word in question without any 'pre-propositions, pre-suppositions and a priori biases that may fall out from the encumbrances of compositionality and sentential verbosity.<sup>20</sup>

In this case therefore, the Igbo concept of truth itself is all about the word- *Okwu* in itself and for itself. Therefore a presupposition-less presentation of truth form *Okwu* in the absent of the 'implicatures' of *E-zi* as already presented above, is possible from the methodology that brackets out the *E* and *Zi* to let the word *Okwu* appear to pure consciousness. This may come in contact with Edmund Husserl's divisions of *noesis* (the act of consciousness) and the *noema* (the object of consciousness).

In line with the approach of Husserl to the objectivism of truth as a definitive 'reference-stance', there is need for an *epoche* that has an Igbo universally valid and intrinsic investigative nature of reference. For 'truth' to reference itself as truth, the elemental-denizens' '*E*'-*Zi* and *Okwu* must universally perceive, remember, identify, think, value, and do themselves as absolute constituted entities in their 'being-self evident' and 'self-being' and 'truly true and truth itself'.

On the ground of the above, this paper states that truth as *Eziokwu* in Igbo can be defined as the 'word-reality' in its '*natura pura*' and that is: *Okwu gba oto- the naked-word (truth)*. And when the opposite is the case, the word so presented can never be true or truth since its appearance is with some language/linguistic cover-clothing and therefore will stand out as vague. A common Igbo dictum says, that *Okwu nyi efe*, or *Okwu nyiri efe o buru ogaranya* – the clothed word that is rich with words or rich text that is tediously verbose (*Ochotompo*) is falsehood and cannot stand the test of any given truth condition in Igbo language. Therefore, for Ndi Igbo and their language, truth is definitely defined as 'truth if and only if the word *Okwu* appears and presents itself to Igbo consciousness in its NUDITY (*Igba okwo oto- aletheia*).

In conclusion, truth and its conditioning, from the stances of '*E-Zi-Okwu*' in Igbo language must appear designed as a theory based on the phenomenological method made possible through the significations and consciousness of the word (*Okwu*) that has appeared to Igbo knowledge as: the nude, unconcealed, unhidden, unmasked, unveiled, uncovered, non-secret and as the adumbrated word (*Okwu gba oto*). Through this Igbo language ventilation, an Igbo truth condition is possible when the word *Okwu* that delivers the 'true, the truth and its truthfulness' must not appear as a linguistic ghost or phantom and must not be sealed off in any Igbo language form that stands in a sociolinguistic expressivity of dark-nesses, obscurities, glooms or foreshadows.

Based on the above stances, *adumbration* is the definitive conception of truth in Igbo. It is the adumbrated Igbo word (*Okwu gba oto*) that stands in its self evident nature, self-being-ness, logical know-ability, knowledge-ability and bedizened in and through the Igbo language consciousness, that can command an Igbo correct reasoning and logical forms for an Igbo theory of truth and the conditions thereof.

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> J. Hornsby, and G. Longworth, *Reading Philosophy of Language* Oxford, Blackwell Pub. Ltd., 2006, p.89.
- <sup>2</sup> D. Kishik, *Wittgenstein's Form of Life*, London, Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008, p.47.
- <sup>3</sup> L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951*, Eds James, K. and Alfred N., Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing, 1993, p. 255. [PO]
- <sup>4</sup> L. Wittgenstein, [PO], p. 255.
- <sup>5</sup> N. Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1970, p.193.
- <sup>6</sup> W. Lycan, *Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction*, London, Routledge, 2000, p.46.
- <sup>7</sup> W. Lycan, *Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction*, p. 152.
- <sup>8</sup> L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Pears, Brain & McGuinness (Trans.), London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1961 [TLP 5.6, 5.62, 5.621, 5.632].
- <sup>9</sup> L. Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914-1916*, (second Edition) Eds. Von Wright, G. H. and G.E.M. Anscombe, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1979, p.77.
- <sup>10</sup> D. Kishik, *Wittgenstein's Form of Life*, p. 48.
- <sup>11</sup> D. Kishik, *Wittgenstein's Form of Life*, p. 61.
- <sup>12</sup> K. K. Prah, *Mother Tongue for Scientific and Technological Development in Africa*, 1995, Bonn, DSE, p.77.
- <sup>13</sup> J. Okonkwo, *Okwu Danahu Onu: The Basic Principle of Igbo Philosophy of Language*, 2012, Imo State University Press, p.57.
- <sup>14</sup> D. Hymes, D., *Foundations in Sociolinguistics: An Ethnographic Approach*, 1977, London Tavistock Publications.
- <sup>15</sup> J. Okonkwo, *Okwu Danahu Onu: The Basic Principle of Igbo Philosophy of Language*, p.59.
- <sup>16</sup> L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed.) Anscombe (Trans), 1958, London, Blackwell, #23.

<sup>17</sup> R. Panda, *Language and World in Wittgenstein: The True Social Bonding*, In *Language and World*, 32nd International Wittgenstein Symposium, 2009, p.325-326.

<sup>18</sup> J. Okonkwo, *Okwu Danahu Onu: The Basic Principle of Igbo Philosophy of Language*, p. 61.

<sup>19</sup> J. L. Austin, "How to do Things with Words." In Urmson (Ed.) *William James Lectures*, Harvard University, 1962, London, Cambridge Mass.

<sup>20</sup> W. G. Lycan, 2000, Cf. p.137, 138; J. Okonkwo, p. 63.