ABSTRACT

This paper addresses one of the most profound metaphysical tensions in classical and Christian thought: the apparent contradiction between the Principle of Sufficient Reason, ex nihilo nihil fit (“nothing comes from nothing”) and the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (creation from nothing). It examines whether the idea that God brought the universe into existence from “nothing” unintentionally reifies a concept that classical metaphysics regards as unintelligible or even incoherent. Drawing from the works of Aquinas, Aristotle, Augustine, and Spinoza, the study evaluates whether divine volition alone suffices as a causal explanation when no substrate precedes creation. Through an analysis of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the ontological continuity of being, and the logic of causality, the paper shows that “nothing” must be understood not as a cause or entity, but as a negation relative to being. Creatio ex nihilo, properly understood, affirms the uniqueness of divine causality and does not violate rational intelligibility when placed within a coherent metaphysical framework. The result is a defence of the doctrine that neither collapses into absurdity nor abandons the philosophical rigor demanded by classical metaphysics.